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THE DISORDERED AND DISCREDITED PLAINTIFF: 
PSYCHIATRIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL LITIGATION 
Deirdre M. Smith* 
ABSTRACT
This Article examines civil defendants’ use of evidence of a
plaintiff’s alleged current or prior psychiatric diagnosis or treatment by
analyzing and critiquing the three primary rationales offered in support 
of the relevancy of such evidence: (1) to suggest an alternative cause of 
the plaintiff’s alleged psychological injuries; (2) to impeach the 
plaintiff’s credibility by asserting that a mental illness interferes with 
the plaintiff’s ability to recount or to perceive events accurately; and (3) 
to reveal certain propensities that inform how the plaintiff likely acted
with respect to the events at issue in the litigation.  While attaching a 
label of mental disorder can be a powerful means to discredit a person,
its role as trial evidence goes largely unexamined, unquestioned, and
unregulated by courts.  Few courts carefully consider whether evidence 
of a plaintiff’s mental illness is truly probative of the issues for which it 
is purportedly offered. I explain that evidence of a plaintiff’s
psychiatric history poses a significant risk of unfair prejudice to the
plaintiff in light of the persistent and pervasive stigmatizing effects of
psychiatric diagnoses. Regardless of the relevancy theory advanced by 
defendants in support of admissibility, fact finders likely use such 
evidence improperly to discount a plaintiff’s credibility and to conclude 
that the plaintiff possesses certain behavioral propensities that weigh in 
favor of a finding for the defendant. I conclude by urging courts that 
face admissibility questions concerning such evidence to closely 
scrutinize the purported relevancy of the evidence and to exercise their 
discretion to guard against factual findings that are ultimately traceable 
to the stigmatizing effects of mental illness.
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It is for ordinary minds, and not for psychoanalysts, that our rules of 
evidence are framed. 
—Justice Benjamin Cardozo1 
INTRODUCTION
In October 1991, Anita Hill became one of the most famous 
complainants in United States legal history when she testified before the
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee about her alleged experience of sexual
harassment by her former employer, then-Judge Clarence Thomas.
After an aggressive cross-examination of Professor Hill by the 
committee members and a public relations campaign by others, the 
Senate voted to confirm Judge Thomas’s nomination to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  A majority of senators and a large segment of the 
American public dismissed Professor Hill’s testimony due to, in large 
part, Judge Thomas’s supporters’ strategy of branding her as being “a 
bit nutty, and a bit slutty.”2  Specifically, the supporters, through debate 
and testimony in the Senate, as well as in statements to the press, 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law.  I am grateful to the
following people who read earlier drafts of this Article and provided many helpful insights: 
Daniel Shuman, Barbara Herrnstein Smith, and Deborah Tuerkheimer.  I am appreciative of Dean 
Peter Pitegoff for providing generous summer research support, and of the staff of the Donald L.
Garbrecht Law Library for its research assistance. 
1 Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933). 
2 David Brock, The Real Anita Hill, AM. SPECTATOR, Mar. 1992, at 18; see also JANE
MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF CLARENCE THOMAS 284-86, 
(1994) (suggesting that Thomas’s allies had portrayed Hill as “having lusted after [her former
boss] with such fervor that her sanity—not to mention her credibility—was in doubt”). 
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suggested that Professor Hill suffered from delusions and a serious 
mental disorder referred to as “erotomania.”3 
The Hill-Thomas controversy was, at its essence, a battle of 
competing stories,4 and in that critical respect it was much like a trial.
In civil litigation, a plaintiff presents the fact finder with a story as a 
basis for recovering damages and other relief.  The defendant’s strategy
generally consists of a combination of undermining the credibility of the
plaintiff and presenting a competing, more plausible version of the
events in question.  Some defendants use evidence of a plaintiff’s 
alleged current or prior psychiatric diagnosis or treatment as part of that 
strategy.  The suggestion of mental disorder can be a powerful means to 
discredit a person, much as its use effectively discredited Professor Hill; 
however, its role as trial evidence in civil litigation goes largely
unexamined, unquestioned, and unregulated by courts. 
Scholarship and case law have extensively examined and 
considered the role of psychiatric testimony in criminal law and other 
legal deprivations of liberty, particularly in the context of evaluating a 
criminal defendant’s alleged mental disorder as it bears on issues such 
as the insanity defense, mens rea, competency, sentencing, and 
involuntary commitment.5  However, the approaches to the admissibility 
of such evidence in the civil and criminal context are not 
interchangeable; the role of a party’s psychiatric history in civil 
litigation is far less clear and has been the focus of minimal scholarship. 
Courts largely fail to note the implications of such evidence, and 
accordingly provide little scrutiny of a defendant’s use of evidence of a 
plaintiff’s psychiatric history.
In a recent article, I reviewed and analyzed federal courts’ 
approaches to controversies regarding discovery of plaintiffs’
psychiatric histories in civil litigation, with a particular focus on
disputes regarding whether a plaintiff had waived the psychotherapist-
patient privilege by making particular allegations, such as claims of
3 Andrew Rosenthal et al., Psychiatry’s Use in Thomas Battle Raises Ethics Issues, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct 20, 1991, at 23; see Paul Fitzgerald & Mary V. Seeman, Erotomania in Women, in 
STALKING AND PSYCHOSEXUAL OBSESSION: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES FOR PREVENTION, 
POLICING AND TREATMENT 165, 166, 170-77 (Julian Boon & Lorraine Sheridan eds., 2002) 
(noting that this condition, which is characterized by “obsessive, excessive, unwanted or
delusional love,” generally appears only in individuals with underlying psychotic or delusional 
disorders); see also MAYER & ABRAMSON, supra note 2, at 306-10. 
4 Senator John C. Danforth, Judge Thomas’s primary sponsor and supporter, explained in his
account of the confirmation process that the controversy boiled down to a question of credibility
and that he developed the “delusion theory” in consultation with several psychiatrists as a way to
explain the sharp disparity in Professor Hill’s and Judge Thomas’s accounts and then injected that
theory into the public debate beginning with an appearance on Face the Nation. JOHN C.
DANFORTH, RESURRECTION: THE CONFIRMATION OF CLARENCE THOMAS 155, 160-61, 168-70 
(1994).
5 See generally CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE: THE ROLE OF LAW,
SCIENCE, AND SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING CULPABILITY AND DANGEROUSNESS (2007). 
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disability discrimination or for emotional distress damages.6  I touched
on only briefly, and left for another day, a close examination of
defendants’ arguments regarding the relevancy and admissibility of 
evidence of such history. I now turn to those questions directly.
This Article considers and analyzes civil defendants’ use of 
evidence of a plaintiff’s alleged current or prior psychiatric diagnosis or 
treatment in three occasionally overlapping contexts.  First, a defendant 
may argue that a plaintiff’s mental illness serves as evidence of one or 
more alternative causes of the plaintiff’s alleged psychological injuries. 
Second, a defendant may use evidence of a psychiatric diagnosis to
impeach the plaintiff’s credibility by asserting that a mental illness
interferes with her ability to perceive or to recount events accurately. 
Third, a defendant may suggest that the plaintiff’s mental illness was a 
factor in the events in question because such condition indicates certain
propensities that inform how the plaintiff likely acted on a particular
occasion.7  Although this last use runs afoul of the character evidence 
prohibition contained in many evidence codes,8 courts generally fail to
recognize it as such. 
Few courts closely examine whether evidence of a plaintiff’s 
mental illness is truly probative of the issues for which a party 
purportedly offers it, and therefore whether it is appropriate to admit it
in trials. Rather, they rely upon assumptions—often incorrect— 
regarding what exactly evidence of mental illness reveals.  Psychiatry
itself constructs “mental illness” and therefore psychiatric diagnoses do
not provide the firm foundation for fact finding that many courts assume
they do.  More significantly, the law provides the concepts of causation,
credibility, and character with case-specific constructions, rather than 
fixed meanings.  In a given case, a court can construct these concepts 
with or without consideration of a person’s alleged mental illness. 
Therefore, a court’s determination of the relevancy of a plaintiff’s 
alleged mental illness with respect to any of these three concepts in a 
given case is not a foregone conclusion, but rather a value-based 
6 Deirdre M. Smith, An Uncertain Privilege: Implied Waiver and the Evisceration of the 
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in the Federal Courts, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 79 (2008). 
7 Another context in which such evidence may be offered in civil litigation is family law,
such as to assert mental illness as a basis for divorce, which has become less common as states
have progressively loosened the requirements for divorce.  See Peter Nash Swisher, Reassessing
Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 31 FAM. L.Q. 269, 270-71 (1997).  Evidence of mental illness
has also been used for determinations of parental fitness in custody disputes.  Courtney Waits,
Comment, The Use of Mental Health Records in Child Custody Proceedings, 17 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 159, 159-61 (2001).  The use of such evidence in these contexts is beyond
the scope of this Article, largely because the overall approach to relevancy in family law differs
significantly from that seen in most civil litigation, particularly where juries rather than courts 
resolve factual issues. 
8 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (mandating that except in certain enumerated instances, 
“[e]vidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of 
proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion”).
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determination of whether such evidence should be considered in
arriving at a “just” result in that particular case. 
This Article concludes that the admission of psychiatric evidence9 
under any of these three approaches implicates the dangers against 
which Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence10 and analogous rules 
used in state courts were intended to guard, which suggests that judges
must make greater use of their discretion to exclude such evidence.
Specifically, and most significantly, the admission of evidence of a 
plaintiff’s psychiatric history poses a significant risk of unfair prejudice 
to the plaintiff in light of the persistent and pervasive stigmatizing
effects of psychiatric diagnoses.  Regardless of the purported basis for 
the relevancy of such evidence, fact finders will, often unwittingly, use
such evidence improperly to discount a plaintiff’s credibility and to 
conclude that the plaintiff possesses certain behavioral propensities that
weigh in favor of a finding for the defendant.  The use of such evidence 
in each of these contexts therefore requires close analysis and careful 
consideration to guard against factual findings that are ultimately
derived from the stigma of mental illness. 
Fact finders are likely to misuse psychiatric evidence, particularly
when offered through expert witnesses, because they have few tools to 
independently evaluate such evidence and thus may overvalue the 
significance of psychiatric diagnoses for the resolution of factual 
questions. Accordingly, trial judges should scrutinize defendants’ 
purported bases for offering such evidence and, even where such 
evidence is ostensibly relevant, should consider whether the potential 
misuse of psychiatric evidence nonetheless warrants its exclusion. 
The rationale offered by courts when admitting evidence of a
plaintiff’s mental illness is nearly always one of ensuring fairness to 
both parties by providing fact finders with evidence that both supports 
9 I will generally use the term “psychiatric evidence” to refer to evidence of an individual’s 
psychiatric diagnosis and/or treatment by a mental health professional.  Such evidence is often,
but not necessarily, offered through an expert witness who is a mental health professional. I use
the term “psychiatric,” as opposed to “psychological,” because my primary focus is on evidence 
of diagnosed mental disorders developed in the field of psychiatry, such as in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manuals published by the American Psychiatric Association, rather than evidence of 
human behavior, syndrome evidence, psychological testing and the like, which is commonly
referred to as “psychological evidence.” However, parties quite often present such psychiatric
diagnoses through the testimony of forensic or clinical psychologists, who, in most jurisdictions,
may also offer opinions on mental disorders and the causation of psychological damages with 
respect to individual litigants. See GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS
FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 23 (3d 
ed. 2007); DANIEL W. SHUMAN, PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE § 8:2, at 8-2-8-5
(3d ed. 2005). 
10 The Rule provides: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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and challenges each party’s core assertions so that such fact finders are
more likely to reach an accurate determination of the disputed facts. 
However, by failing to acknowledge the unique complexities of 
psychiatric evidence and the impact of stigma on those who have been
labeled as having a mental disorder, courts too often fail to rule in a way
that is in fact fair and just. 
Part I of this Article examines and critiques the use of psychiatric
evidence to rebut a plaintiff’s claims for psychological injuries.  It 
begins by reviewing the general principles of causation in civil litigation
and contrasting them with psychiatry’s views of causation.11  Part I then
analyzes the rationales accepted and rejected by courts regarding the
role of psychiatric evidence in determining the causation and
apportionment of damages.12  Part II considers courts’ conflicting views 
on the role of psychiatric evidence on the issue of a trial witness’s 
credibility, and particularly a civil plaintiff’s testimony.13 Part III
reviews the character evidence prohibition in more detail and then
demonstrates how, notwithstanding such broad prohibition, courts admit 
psychiatric evidence that is rife with negative characterizations of civil 
plaintiffs and that can be easily used to draw inferences about such 
plaintiffs’ propensities and predispositions.14 
Part IV discusses three distinct dangers presented by civil 
defendants’ use of psychiatric evidence.  First, the stigmatizing effect of 
mental illness continues to pervade our society, and associating a
plaintiff with a psychiatric label directly implicates such attitudes and 
beliefs.15  Second, psychiatric diagnoses are of little utility in reaching 
accurate factual conclusions in most civil litigation.16  Third, fact finders 
generally lack appreciation of the complexity of evidence regarding 
mental illness.17  These dangers, I argue, require courts to scrutinize the
purported relevancy of psychiatric evidence and use their discretion
under Rule 403 and other rules to exclude such evidence to guard
against the dangers of unfair prejudice, misuse of the evidence, and 
confusion of the issues.18 I conclude by suggesting that the 
consideration of a party’s mental illness in any part of the analysis in 
civil litigation implicates basic questions of justice.19 
While the focus of this Article is the admissibility of psychiatric
evidence at trial, trends in the case law on evidence have a direct
11 See infra notes 22-114 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 61-198 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 199-271 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 272-319 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 320-330 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 331-346 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 347-353 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 355-379 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 381-388 and accompanying text. 
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bearing on the scope of civil discovery, which is generally limited to
evidence that is “relevant to any party’s claim or defense,” meaning that 
it is “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.”20 Therefore, a court’s determination that a plaintiff’s 
psychiatric history is, for example, relevant to the issue of her claim for
emotional distress damages will enhance a defendant’s position in a 
dispute regarding the discoverability of evidence of such history.21 By
extension, the prospect of the admissibility of such evidence at trial has 
direct impact on the respective settlement positions of the parties.  Thus, 
even as civil trials become less frequent in contemporary litigation, the 
likelihood of the admissibility (or not) of evidence at trial has bearing 
on the entire course of litigation. 
I. CAUSATION
The case law suggests that civil defendants that seek the 
admissibility of evidence of a plaintiff’s preexisting or current 
psychiatric diagnosis most frequently argue that the relevance of such 
evidence is its connection to the issue of causation of emotional distress 
or other forms of psychological injury alleged by the plaintiff. 
Specifically, these defendants claim, evidence of preexisting or 
concurrent psychiatric illness can demonstrate possible alternative
causes of the plaintiff’s alleged psychological injuries.22  Such
alternative causes may suggest that the claimed psychological injury did 
not in fact arise from the defendant’s alleged conduct or that there are
multiple causes of the plaintiff’s current distress, requiring
apportionment among these various causes to ensure that the defendant 
is not required to compensate the plaintiff for injuries that are not 
wholly attributable to its actions. 
There are two broad contexts in which the concept of
psychological injury has developed in the law, and particularly in tort 
law. One is the development of distinct torts that permit recovery based 
upon “pure emotional harm,” a psychological injury occurring in the 
absence of a physical injury.23  These actions for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress became
20  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
21 See Smith, supra note 6, at 121-28.  Indeed, as discussed infra at notes 155-157 and 
accompanying text, a significant number of controversies regarding the relevancy of such 
evidence are raised and resolved during the discovery stage. 
22 See James J. McDonald, Jr. & Francine B. Kulick, Preface to MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL
INJURIES IN EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION, at xli (James J. McDonald, Jr. & Francine Kulick eds., 2d 
ed. 2001). 
23  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM ch. 8, scope note 
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007). 
     
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
  
 
   
   
   
 
    
 
 
 
 
   
    
 
  
756 CARDOZO LAW RE VIEW  [Vol. 31:3 
widely recognized in state courts in the second half of the twentieth 
century.24  In most instances, before any liability may be imposed, 
courts require a showing of a particular degree of emotional harm— 
usually “severe”—that “a reasonable person in the same circumstances
would suffer.”25 
The second context in which psychological injuries are the focus 
concerns the extent of any emotional and psychological injuries, most
commonly referred to as “emotional distress” damages, allegedly
caused by a defendant’s wrongful actions that serve as a basis for 
imposing liability in a personal injury case (including tort,
discrimination, and civil rights litigation).  Thus, in the first context, the 
presence of psychological injury has bearing on a finding of liability,
while in the second context, such injuries determine the amount of
damages awarded to a plaintiff.26  Both contexts require fact finders to
make determinations of causation—that is, whether the defendant’s
actions or omissions caused the plaintiff to suffer some degree of
emotional distress.  Depending upon the specific claims in a given case, 
a defendant may assert that psychiatric evidence of a plaintiff’s prior or 
current mental illness is relevant in either or both contexts. 
The legal basis for recovery of psychological injuries evolved in 
the face of long-standing judicial skepticism of such claims.27 
Therefore, when the claims were eventually permitted to go forward, 
they often had to conform to certain conditions and standards—such as
the “zone of danger” test28 or the requirement of accompanying physical 
injury29—that have been characterized by some as “artificial, 
convoluted, and without merit,” and devoid of empirical support.30 
While many acknowledge that psychological injuries can be real and
cause serious and lasting impairment, others remain wary of basing
damage awards upon a “soft” science such as psychiatry whose
diagnoses are “fluid and debatable.”31  This skepticism about the 
24 Id. § 45 reporter’s note; id. § 46 reporter’s note.
25 Id. § 45 cmt. i (using the standard of “[s]evere emotional disturbance”). 
26 Pearson v. City of Austin, Civ. A. No. 99-CA-434JN, 2001 WL 681663, at *1 (W.D. Tex. 
Apr. 4, 2001) (noting distinction between “[pleading] emotional distress as a cause of action” and
“[pleading] mental anguish as part of [plaintiffs’] damages”). 
27 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 45 scope note
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (“Courts have played an especially critical role in cabining this tort 
[intentional (or reckless) infliction of emotional disturbance] by requiring ‘extreme and 
outrageous’ conduct and ‘severe’ emotional disturbance.”). 
28 John A. Call, Liability for Psychological Injury: Yesterday and Today, in PSYCHOLOGICAL 
INJURIES AT TRIAL 40, 47 (Izabela Z. Schultz & Douglas O. Brady eds., 2003) (American Bar 
Ass’n CD-ROM).
29 Id. at 43. 
30 Id. at 41; see also Daniel W. Shuman, Persistent Reexperiences in Psychiatry and Law:
Current and Future Trends in Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Litigation, in  PSYCHOLOGICAL
INJURIES AT TRIAL, supra note 28, at 850, 852. 
31 Call, supra note 28, at 41. 
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validity of such claims may well account in large part for courts’
reluctance to limit the evidence offered by defendants to rebut claims of 
psychological injury. 
Emotional distress and other psychic injuries are a key component 
of civil noneconomic damages and are now recoverable in a wide range 
of civil actions, including common law tort and statutory civil rights 
actions.32  Indeed, such alleged injuries may be the exclusive basis for 
damages in employment and other discrimination cases.33  The 
prevalence of such damage claims means that defendants often seek 
discovery and admissibility of psychiatric evidence. While the
relevance of such evidence is often assumed without controversy, there 
is no framework in either psychiatry or the law to guide fact finders on 
the appropriate use of psychiatric evidence to resolve factual disputes 
regarding causation and the apportionment of psychological damages. 
A. General Concepts of Causation 
At the outset, it is valuable to review the basic framework of
causation34 in the law and particularly in personal injury litigation, the
specific context in which damages for psychiatric injuries are sought. 
Tort principles regarding damages and causation generally apply to all 
kinds of actions in which a personal injury is alleged, including civil 
rights and discrimination cases.35 
While one may initially assume that the determination of causation
of injuries is a straight-forward, objective, factual inquiry, causation is,
in fact, a necessarily complex concept.  Several fields and disciplines 
employ conceptualizations of causation for varied purposes.  The legal 
system has constructed the notion of “causation” for the purpose of 
allocating legal responsibility for a given event and for determining
whether a payment of compensatory damages is warranted.  While law
32 See Smith, supra note 6, at 84-85 (discussing the expansion of the types of cases in which 
emotional distress damages may be raised); McDonald & Kulick, supra note 22, at xxxvi-vii 
(discussing same with respect to employment discrimination claims).
33 McDonald & Kulick, supra note 22, at xxxviii.
34 The terms “causation” and “causality” are frequently used interchangeably in both law and 
psychology. Gerald Young & Andrew W. Kane, Causality in Psychology and Law, in
CAUSALITY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURY: PRESENTING EVIDENCE IN COURT 13, 19 (Gerald 
Young et al. eds, 2007). 
35  DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 82 (2000) (“Section 1983 authorizes tort claims for 
deprivation of federal rights under color of state law.”); see also Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. 
Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986) (“We have repeatedly noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates ‘a
species of tort liability . . . .’” (citation omitted)).  The same analysis applies to damages claims
sought under other civil rights statutes.  See DOBBS, supra, at 81-82 (“Civil rights violations are
torts. They have generated an important specialty, in which the courts look to common law tort 
rules as models without necessarily accepting their limitations.”).
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has often drawn from other fields (particularly philosophy) when
attempting to formulate approaches to causation, there are limits to the 
usefulness of more abstract notions of causation in the context of
assigning liability.  As one commentator has noted:
It is tempting for a legal theorist to suppose that we should be able to
supply judges and juries with an adequate and precise analysis of
causal connection.  This project, however, is probably doomed from
the start.  Philosophers have labored long and hard on the question of 
how to analyze causation, with a striking lack of success. . . . [I]f the 
law is waiting for philosophers to offer something better than a
prephilosophical grasp of what is involved in one thing causing
another, the law had better be very patient indeed.36 
As a primary matter, a defendant is liable only for the harm it 
brought about in some respect. This is a counterfactual inquiry
requiring a determination of whether the event or injury would have
occurred without the actions (or inaction) of the defendant.37  Generally 
this requires a “but for” analysis.38 Thus, there is an initial 
indispensable requirement that the defendant’s actions (or omissions)
are the “factual” cause of the plaintiff’s alleged injuries, and this burden
is assigned to the party seeking to recover damages, usually the
plaintiff.39 
However, a defendant is not liable for any and all harm for which 
its actions are the factual cause. Rather, law further refines the notion 
of causation with the concept of “legal” cause, commonly referred to as 
“proximate cause.”  Courts have developed several tests and concepts to 
distinguish factual cause from legal cause to “narrow[] the class of all
tortious causal factors to the legally responsible tortious factors.”40  For
example, pursuant to the Second Restatement of Torts, many courts 
have held that the defendant’s actions must have been a “substantial 
factor” (but not necessarily the sole cause) of the damage in order to
impose liability.41  Conversely, liability is excluded where the link 
between the defendant’s actions and the result is too remote.42 
36 Richard Fumerton & Ken Kress, Causation and the Law: Preemption, Lawful Sufficiency, 
and Causal Sufficiency, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 83, 102-05 (2001). 
37 Richard Scheines, Causation, Truth, and the Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 959, 960-61 (2008). 
38 See  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26 cmt. B
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
39 Throughout this Article, I use the term “plaintiff” to describe the party asserting a claim for 
damages; in certain cases, such as where there has been a counter-claim or third-party claim, 
another party may be seeking to recover damages. 
40 Fumerton & Kress, supra note 36, at 87. 
41  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431-32 (1965); see, e.g., Chism v. White Oak Feed 
Co., 612 S.W.2d 873, 881 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that it was “[b]eyond question” that an
“unguarded auger was a substantial factor in bringing about the amputation” of the plaintiff’s leg
and affirming judgment against defendant). 
42 See, e.g., Lear Siegler, Inc., v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470, 471-72 (Tex. 1991) (holding that 
causal connection between alleged defect in highway sign and driver’s death was too remote to
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With respect to any event or condition there are of course 
theoretically infinite causes.  Legal causation, as implemented through
these rules, is a normative means to narrow these causes to a focused 
determination of whether and to what extent the defendant is liable.
New York Court of Appeals Judge William Andrews noted in his 
dissent in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. that by “proximate” 
cause we mean that “because of convenience, of public policy, of a 
rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of
events beyond a certain point.”43  Legal scholars such as Richard Wright
strive to separate the nonnormative or empirical approaches to
determining causation from the normative or value-laden tests.44  More
recently, a pair of commentators observed: “Traditionally, it is said that 
the proximate cause concept selects from among all actual causes the
legally responsible causes by invoking policy considerations.  But
whether something is a causally relevant factor in producing some
outcome may be nonnormative through and through.”45 
Most courts do not expressly acknowledge and juries do not 
understand that the determination of legal, as opposed to factual,
causation is a normative determination.  Jurors, of course, are not 
required to resolve these philosophical questions of causation. Indeed, 
they have no sense of how carefully constructed causation is because
they are instructed to consider all of the evidence they have received to
determine causation, generally under the “substantial factor” 
formulation.46  Thus, it is primarily through rulings on the admissibility 
of evidence that the legal system constructs causation on a trial-by-trial
impose liability).
43 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting);
see also DOBBS, supra note 35, at 443 (“The proximate cause issue, in spite of the terminology, is 
not about causation at all but about appropriate scope of responsibility.”).
44 See generally Richard W. Wright, Once More Into The Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal 
Contribution, and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1071 (2001); see also
Fumerton & Kress, supra note 36, at 84.  Wright proposed an alternative to the traditional “but
for” test of actual causation by expanding upon the “NESS” test, which states “that a particular
condition was a cause of a specific consequence if and only if it was a necessary element of a set
of antecedent actual conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of the consequence.”
Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1774, 1790 (1985) (emphasis 
altered). He proposed it as a way to address some of the issues for which the “but for” test is
inadequate, such as overdetermined causes (when two or more causes act simultaneously, each of 
which could have been an actual cause).  Some have criticized Wright’s approach as being
inadequate to account for all questions of actual causation that may arise.  Fumerton & Kress, 
supra note 36, at 95-102. 
45 Fumerton & Kress, supra note 36, at 88 (emphasis added). 
46 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872, 878-79 (Cal. 1991); N.Y. PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL § 1:37 (Comm. on Pattern Jury Instructions Ass’n of Supreme Court 
Justices 2008) (“As the jurors, your fundamental duty is to decide, from all the evidence that you
have heard and the exhibits that have been submitted, what the facts are.”); id. § 2:70 (“An act or
omission is regarded as a cause of an injury if it was a substantial factor in bringing about the 
injury, that is, if it had such an effect in producing the injury that reasonable people would regard
it as a cause of the injury.”). 
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basis. By ruling that something is “relevant” to the determination of
causation, the court configures the causation question in a particular
dispute, leaving for the fact finder the ultimate determination of the 
answer to the question. 
The normative construction of legal causation thus presents many 
opportunities for creative advocacy; attorneys use the general concepts
to argue for and against the admissibility of evidence. This is 
particularly true for defendants who may argue that they are offering 
certain evidence to demonstrate some alternative factual cause of the
plaintiff’s injuries (whether it be another tortfeasor or an innocent 
cause).47  There are few general rules that narrow the field of potential 
alternative factual causes and few instructions, other than the
“substantial factor” language, to guide fact finders’ use of such evidence 
of alternative causes in determining whether or not the defendant’s
actions were the legal cause. 
Where a defendant offers evidence of allegedly alternative causes 
of the plaintiff’s injury, fact finders may be required to make additional 
findings regarding apportionment of the extent of the injury caused by
the defendant’s actions.  A fact finder may also conclude that the 
alternative cause is in fact the entire cause of the injury.  Thus, if a
defendant can demonstrate that the plaintiff would have continued to 
experience, or perhaps would have inevitably experienced, the same 
harm regardless of the defendant’s actions, such finding of causal 
preemption will mitigate or eliminate the defendant’s liability for such 
harm.48 
A concept closely related to, but often confused with, alternative 
causation is the “thin skull” or “eggshell skull” plaintiff.  Under this
principle, a defendant is liable for all harm caused by its conduct even if
the degree of harm experienced by the plaintiff was not foreseeable due 
to a preexisting (but perhaps latent) vulnerability or condition of the 
plaintiff. 49  Thus, a defendant is liable for aggravation of a preexisting 
injury regardless of whether such aggravation was itself foreseeable.50 
47 Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving
Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1356 (1981) (“There are
always forces and conditions other than the defendant’s conduct that must be considered in
valuing an interest. Some of these forces will constitute contributing causes of the injury . . . .”).
48 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26 cmt. k
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
49 Id. § 31; King, supra note 47, at 1357 (“Generally, a preexisting condition may be defined 
as a disease, condition, or force that has become sufficiently associated with the victim to be
factored into the value of the interest destroyed, and that has become so before the defendant’s
conduct has reached a similar stage.”).
50 There can be some confusion, however, in cases alleging negligent infliction of emotional 
distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress, because the question of liability turns on 
whether the defendant’s actions could have caused severe emotional distress to a person of
“ordinary” sensibilities. See, e.g., Poole v. Copland, Inc., 498 S.E.2d 602, 604-05 (N.C. 1998). 
Also in sexual harassment cases, some courts have concluded that the objective component of the
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Even in cases where the thin skull rule applies, however, the
defendant is liable only for the extent of the exacerbation of the
preexisting condition and not the entirety of the plaintiff’s injury;
accordingly, fact finders may be required to determine apportionment in 
such cases.  Similarly, if the evidence suggests that a preexisting
condition (or some other agent) in fact entirely caused the harm 
complained of by the plaintiff, then the thin skull rule does not apply.51 
Some courts note a distinction between an asymptomatic or latent
condition—for which the defendant is entirely liable—and a preexisting 
symptomatic condition which requires apportionment, if possible, 
because the defendant should not be held liable for the symptoms that 
the plaintiff was already experiencing at the time of the allegedly
tortious action.  One court explained the distinction as being between a 
“pre-existing condition” and “pre-existing injury,” holding that it is only 
with respect to the latter that apportionment is required.52 
The principles of alternative causation and thin skull plaintiffs can
be confused as their difference lies primarily in strategy.  A plaintiff 
may invoke the “thin skull” principle as a basis to explain why her 
injuries may initially seem out of proportion to the initial injury and to 
recover for such aggravated injury.53  However, even if the plaintiff
makes no thin skull argument, a defendant can use evidence of a 
preexisting condition to argue that such condition, not the defendant’s
tortious actions, is a partial or substantial cause of the plaintiff’s 
injuries.54 
test set forth in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993)—whether the plaintiff’s
workplace was one that a reasonable person would find to be hostile or abusive—precludes the
application of the thin skull rule to liability questions in sexual harassment cases. Sudtelgte v. 
Reno, No. 90-1016-CV-W-6, 1994 WL 3406, at *14 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 3, 1994).  Nonetheless, the
thin skull rule itself can apply in such claims with respect to the extent of damages actually
suffered by the plaintiff. 
51 Michael D. Green, The Intersection of Factual Causation and Damages, 55 DEPAUL L.
REV. 671, 679-81 (2006); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM
§ 31 cmts. a, b (2005). 
52 Lovely v. Allstate Ins. Co., 658 A.2d 1091, 1093 n.1 (Me. 1995) (Lipez, J., concurring). 
53  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. d, reporters’ 
note (2005); see, e.g., Freeman v. Busch, 349 F.3d 582, 590 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiff 
in tort case alleging sexual assault was entitled to thin skull instruction based on evidence that she 
had received prior psychiatric treatment for sexual abuse and that her condition was exacerbated
by the alleged rape); Hare v. H & R Indus., No. 00-CV-4533, 2002 WL 777956, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 
Apr. 29, 2002) (holding in a sexual harassment case that, “[w]hile several other factors
contributed to Plaintiff’s [psychiatric] hospitalization [soon after the incident],” the defendant is
still liable to the plaintiff for all of the medical expenses based upon the thin skull rule and the 
fact that the harms were impossible to apportion). 
54 See, e.g., McCleland v. Montgomery Ward. & Co., No. 95-C-23, 1995 WL 571324, at *1-3 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 1995) (holding that plaintiff’s waiver of claim for exacerbation of preexisting
injury did not provide basis to exclude evidence of prior psychological treatment); see also King, 
supra note 47, at 1361 (“The ‘take him as you find him’ rule does not, however, make the
victim’s preaccident condition irrelevant.”).
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Generally, causation is a concept distinct from valuation of harm
or injury; the former is generally an all-or-nothing determination.55 
Where there are multiple potential causes of harm requiring 
apportionment, the distinction is less clear.  In determining the amount 
of compensatory damages to award a plaintiff, a fact finder may need to 
reduce the figure to reflect the causal role of alleged alternative causes 
to arrive at a figure that reflects the degree of the defendant’s liability. 
The fact finder’s task of determining causation of harm can become 
quite complicated where the plaintiff had a preexisting condition but 
there is also some harm, including exacerbation of such condition, 
attributable to the defendant.  There is little consensus in the case law 
regarding which party has the burden of proving the extent of the 
aggravated harm as distinguished from the preexisting harm.56 
Many courts note an exception to the rule requiring apportionment 
of the plaintiff’s harm where there is evidence of alternative causes.  A 
court may determine as a matter of law that the plaintiff’s harm is not
divisible or subject to apportionment between the various causes 
because of the very nature of that harm.57  Where the damages between 
the preexisting condition and the aggravated condition cannot be 
apportioned, the defendant is liable for the full amount of the harm even
if a preexisting condition was a cause in part.58  In such instances, most 
courts will hold that the defendant is liable for the full extent of the
harm because it is preferable to have a tortfeasor pay more than its share 
than to let an injured plaintiff receive less than full compensation.59 
Thus, when the court considers certain evidence offered to show 
apportionment to be inappropriate for a fact finder’s consideration, the 
55 King, supra note 47, at 1356-57. 
56  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. d(2),
reporters’ note (2005).  See, e.g., Stoleson v. United States, 708 F.2d 1217, 1222-24 (7th Cir.
1983) (Posner, J.) (holding that it is plaintiff’s burden to prove aggravation of preexisting medical 
or mental condition caused by defendant’s conduct and to apportion the damages between the 
preexisting condition and the aggravation); Shippen v. Parrott, 553 N.W.2d 503, 507 (S.D. 1996) 
(holding that it is plaintiff’s burden to show not only that the defendant’s conduct was a
substantial factor in causing the aggravation of a preexisting condition but also, that such 
damages must be apportioned from damages caused by nonactionable causes); see also King, 
supra note 47, at 1390 (“Generalization about the burden of proof in the context of preexisting 
conditions . . . is . . . difficult because of a failure of the courts adequately to distinguish and
separate causation and valuation.”). 
57  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A cmt. i (1965) (“Certain kinds of harm, by their 
very nature, are normally incapable of any logical, reasonable, or practical division.”); DOBBS, 
supra note 35, at 422-23. 
58 Shippen, 553 N.W.2d at 507.  The exception was not triggered in Shippen because there 
was no evidence of aggravation of a preexisting condition. 
59 Lovely v. Allstate Ins. Co., 658 A.2d 1091, 1092-93 (Me. 1995).  Thus, the defendant 
generally assumes a functional burden of proof on apportionment since it is liable for the full 
extent of the plaintiff’s harm if the plaintiff’s harm is found to be indivisible.  RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. d(1) (2005). 
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court can render such evidence irrelevant by determining that the
alleged injuries are not subject to apportionment.60 
Courts generally apply all of these principles to claims for 
psychological injury.  As with any other personal injury claim, it is the
plaintiff’s burden to establish that the factual and legal causes of her 
psychological injury are attributable to the defendant’s actions. A
defendant may argue in response that some other condition or event was 
in part or entirely the actual cause of the injury.  Similarly, a plaintiff 
may raise a “thin skull” argument and claim that the defendant’s
conduct exacerbated a preexisting psychological condition giving rise to 
a far more serious psychological injury than might be expected.61  In  
some cases, the issue is whether the preexisting condition or 
vulnerability is an indication that the psychological injury was 
inevitable and therefore the defendant should escape liability entirely.62 
Determination of causation of harm requires courts and fact finders 
to make clear distinctions and quantification of a plaintiff’s injury and
its relation to the defendant’s conduct.  However, where the harm at 
issue is an alleged psychological injury, requiring the application of 
these concepts to causation of such injury moves the task far into the 
realm of legal (and psychiatric) fiction. 
B. Psychiatry’s View of the Causation of Mental Illness 
Before turning to an analysis of how courts apply these general 
concepts of causation to questions of the admissibility of psychiatric 
evidence, it is important to consider how the field of psychiatry63 
approaches the controversial question of causation of mental disorders. 
There are fundamental differences between the methods used in the law
(in terms of civil personal injury litigation broadly defined) and in 
psychiatry to approach the issue of “causation.”  Indeed, in psychiatry,
causation has no clear role. 
In clinical practice, psychiatrists and psychologists (collectively,
“clinicians”), have little concern for causation or etiology when
60 See, e.g., Robinson v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., No. 99-0339-CV-W-3, 2000 WL 564203 (W.D. 
Mo. Apr. 6, 2000) (ruling that emotional distress claim in sexual harassment case was not subject 
to apportionment based upon alleged alternative stressors, and, therefore, plaintiff need not 
respond to discovery questions regarding alleged extramarital affairs). 
61 See, e.g., Miley v. Landry, 582 So. 2d 833 (La. 1991) (holding defendant liable for full 
extent of injury where plaintiff argued that a car accident triggered a recurrence of psychosis that 
had been in remission for several years). 
62 See, e.g., Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169, 1173-74 (2d Cir. 1970); Salas v. 
United States, 974 F. Supp. 202, 208-10 (W.D.N.Y. 1997). 
63 This discussion of the varying perspectives on the causation of mental illness also applies
to the field of psychology.  For simplicity reasons only, I use the term “psychiatry.” 
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diagnosing and treating mental disorders, particularly under the current 
approach advanced in the American Psychiatric Association’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders  (DSM).64 
Clinical diagnosis can be done in a matter of minutes based upon a 
compilation of symptoms determined through a patient’s self-report and
the clinician’s observations.65 Psychiatric diagnoses are subject to
repeated revisions during a course of treatment; they operate as 
“working theories” rather than definitive determinations.66  Psychiatry is
also less concerned with determining agents of cause in developing 
treatment plans, as compared with most other fields of medicine which 
often regard the identification of etiology as necessary to prevent further
or future injury and to determine the appropriate treatment modality.67 
The recent editions of the DSM, referred to by one pair of 
commentators as a “consensus document” rather than a “bible,”68 have
been atheoretical on the issue of causation,69 with the exception of the 
criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).70 The DSM, from the 
64  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS, at xxxiii (4th ed. text rev. 2000) (DSM-IV-TR); see ALLAN V. HORWITZ & JEROME 
C. WAKEFIELD, THE LOSS OF SADNESS: HOW PSYCHIATRY TRANSFORMED NORMAL SORROW 
INTO DEPRESSIVE DISORDER 97 (2007). 
65 T.M. LUHRMANN, OF TWO MINDS: THE GROWING DISORDER IN AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY, 
40-45 (2000); Terence W. Campbell, Challenging the Evidentiary Reliability of DSM-IV, in
PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURIES AT TRIAL, supra note 28, at 436, 440-41; Abilash Gopal & Harold 
Bursztajn, On Skepticism and Tolerance in Psychiatry and Forensic Psychiatry, PSYCHIATRIC
TIMES 1 (Apr. 15, 2007) (noting that due to time pressure and “conditions of uncertainty” many 
clinicians use shortcuts and “make premature cognitive commitments” when arriving at a
psychiatric diagnosis, and concluding that “[a]s a result, diagnostic reliability is conflated with
diagnostic validity”).
66 See Mary E. Stumo et al., Using Psychiatric and Psychological Experts at Trial—Defense 
Perspective, in PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURIES AT TRIAL, supra note 28, at 1309, 1312. By contrast, 
“the law has virtually no mechanisms for deferring the resolution of disputes until additional 
scientific information is gathered.”  Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony: The Supreme Court’s 
Rules, 16 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 57, 63 (2000), cited in Craig Haney & Amy Smith, Science, Law, 
and Psychological Injury: The Daubert Standards and Beyond, in PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURIES AT 
TRIAL, supra note 28, at 184, 187. 
67 See Izabela Z. Schultz, Psychological Causality Determination in Personal Injury and 
Workers’ Compensation Contexts, in PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURIES AT TRIAL, supra note 28, at 102, 
104 (noting the distinction between treatment-oriented and causation-oriented assessments of 
mental illness). But see Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal 
Construct, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 247 (1999) (“[Physicians] do not care much about the disease’s
etiology—the theory of its origin or cause—unless understanding causation would assist in
diagnosis and treatment.”). 
68 Renee L. Binder & Dale E. McNiel, Some Issues in Psychiatry, Psychology, and the Law, 
59 HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1197-98 (2008); Gopal & Bursztajn, supra note 65 (noting that some 
“ill-trained attorneys” erroneously believe that the DSM is the “bible of psychiatry” or that
psychiatry “can be practiced from a cookbook”).
69  HORWITZ & WAKEFIELD, supra note 64; Jerry von Talge, Overcoming Courtroom 
Challenges to the DSM-IV Part II: Preparing for and Overcoming Courtroom Challenges to
DSM-IV, in PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURIES AT TRIAL, supra note 28, at 427, 431. 
70 PTSD is one of the most controversial diagnoses, in large part due to this distinction. 
Robert L. Spitzer et al., Revisiting the Institute of Medicine Report on the Validity of
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third edition forward, is largely a descriptive, symptom-based approach 
to diagnosis.71 As of now, psychiatric disorders are considered
idiopathic and “there is no method for externally validating current 
diagnostic constructs.”72  One psychiatrist has suggested that there is 
insufficient tested, data-based analysis to support “reliable and valid
statements regarding causation.”73  He further suggests that psychiatry 
embrace a more “parsimonious application of ‘due to’ diagnoses in 
daily clinical practice.”74 
During the heyday of psychoanalytic theory, clinicians gave much
attention to the sources of neuroses, which were generally attributed to
internal conflicts.75  Contemporary observers also note that, during early 
days of psychiatry, a hallmark of mental disorder was that the 
symptoms did not appear to be in response to any sort of external cause, 
such as a trauma or loss,76 but that the current diagnostic criteria do not
exclude such reactions.77  Some have recently criticized the DSM’s 
failure to account for the context in which the symptoms arose in the 
diagnostic criteria for major depressive disorder.78  The label of “mental 
disorder,” they suggest, should be reserved for those individuals who
continue to react to stressful events long after they have ended, 
suggesting the presence of “internal dysfunctions” as the pivotal causes 
of the persistent symptoms.79 
Thus, psychiatry does not provide a stable, uncontroversial 
conception of causation that can be imported easily into the legal realm.
However, notwithstanding the DSM’s generally agnostic stand on
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 49 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 319, 319 (2008) (“[A] key
distinguishing feature of PTSD is that it is not agnostic to etiology . . . PTSD rests on the
assumption of a specific etiology, whereby a distinct set of events (criterion A) is assumed to be 
the uniformly most potent contributor to outcome.”).  One other possible exception to the DSM’s 
general approach is the diagnosis of “Adjustment disorder”; some have criticized its broad criteria 
as pathologizing “a vast range of . . . normal loss responses.”  HORWITZ & WAKEFIELD, supra
note 64, at 115. 
71  HORWITZ & WAKEFIELD, supra note 64 (noting that, beginning with the DSM-II, 
diagnostic criteria were “descriptive rather than etiological and purged references to postulated
psychodynamic causes of a disorder”). 
72 Eric D. Caine, Determining Causation in Psychiatry, in ADVANCING DSM: DILEMMAS IN 
PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS 1, 1 (Katherine A. Phillips et al. eds., 2003).
73 Id. at 14.  Dr. Caine specifically suggests that the field of psychiatry undertake such
analyses. 
74 Id. at 17. 
75 Id. at 2. 
76  HORWITZ & WAKEFIELD, supra note 64, at 71 (“[T]here is a remarkably solid and well-
elaborated tradition of distinguishing disorder from normal emotion via various versions of the
‘with cause’ versus ‘without cause’ criterion that goes back to ancient times.”); ALLAN V.
HORWITZ, CREATING MENTAL ILLNESS 29 (2002) (“[T]hat depression is ‘without cause’ implies
that symptoms of depression ‘with cause’ would not be considered signs of mental disorder.”) 
77  HORWITZ & WAKEFIELD, supra note 64, at 101. 
78 Id. at 101-03. 
79  HORWITZ, supra note 76, at 30. 
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causation and the unsettled views on PTSD,80 the field of forensic
psychiatry, in which psychiatrists render opinions on causation of 
psychological injuries in the context of legal disputes,81 has flourished
in recent decades.82  One can assume that the development of the PTSD
diagnosis, together with the increased availability of damages for
emotional distress, has aided such expansion to a significant degree.83 
Forensic psychiatrists undertake an analysis—the determination of the
extent to which an identified event caused a psychological injury—that 
is not generally included in clinical treatment.84  Some psychiatric 
commentators are notably skeptical about the field’s ability to reach
conclusions on causation.85  One psychiatrist wrote: “Cause and effect 
relationships in psychiatry are more a product of speculation than 
80 See, e.g., Gerald M. Rosen et al., Editorial, Problems with the Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder Diagnosis and Its Future in DSM-V, 192 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 3 (2008); Steven Taylor 
& Gordon J.G. Asmundson, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Current Concepts and Controversies, 
1 PSYCHOL. INJ. & L. 59 (2008). 
81 See James J. McDonald, Jr. & Francine B. Kulick, Preparing the Case for the Expert, in
MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL INJURIES IN EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION, supra note 22, at 262-63. 
82 See Alan A. Stone, The Ethical Boundaries of Forensic Psychiatry: A View from the Ivory 
Tower, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 167, 167 (2008) (“Whatever the reasons, forensic
psychiatry seems to be flourishing.”). 
83 In reference to PTSD, psychiatrist and former President of the American Psychiatric
Association Alan Stone observed that “[n]o diagnosis in the history of American psychiatry has
had a more dramatic and pervasive impact on law and social justice . . . .  The recognition of this
disorder by the medical community changed the nature of personal injury litigation . . . .”  Alan 
A. Stone, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and the Law: Critical Review of the New Frontier, 21 
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 23, 23-34 (1993); see also Roger K. Pitman et al., Legal 
Issues in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, in PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURIES AT TRIAL, supra note 28,
at 861, 861-63 (“Perhaps more than any other psychological or medical disorder, [PTSD] has
influenced, and been influenced by, the law. . . .  [It] has become the most important diagnosis in
the forensic psychology of personal injury . . . .”).  Professor Shuman also notes that the
development of the PTSD diagnosis occurred at a time when, coincidentally, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence shifted towards a bias of admissibility of relevant evidence and tort law expanded 
recovery for psychological injuries.  Shuman, supra note 30, at 853. As one group of
commentators observed: “The recognition of the diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) in DSM-III has transformed and expanded the horizons of tort litigation, resulting in the
recognition of a host of new claims tied to the diagnosis.”  Stuart A. Greenberg et al., Unmasking 
Forensic Diagnosis, 27 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 1, 7 (2004) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  The American Psychiatric Association is taking up many of the emerging 
questions about PTSD as it develops the Fifth Edition of the DSM.  There is some movement to
shift, substantially revise, or even eliminate the disorder.  Gerald M. Rosen & Scott O. Lilienfeld,
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: An Empirical Evaluation of Core Assumptions, 28 CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. REV. 837, 855-57 (2008).  It is difficult to underestimate the impact on civil litigation
if PTSD is fundamentally altered in DSM-V. 
84 See 1 JAY ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 30, 32-
33 (5th ed. 1995) (describing what he terms as the “gap” between diagnosis of a mental disorder 
and other clinical findings, and the determination of a specific legal issue and quoting a 
psychologist who raised concerns about the use in the legal settings, without modification, of
“assessment models” designed for clinical settings) (quoting Thomas Grisso, The Economic and 
Scientific Future of Forensic Psychological Assessment, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 831, 834
(1987)).
85 Id. at 37 (“Forensic psychiatry is a field that is long on controversy and short on data.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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scientific accuracy.”86  He suggests that it is therefore not possible to 
determine to a “reasonable medical probability”87 whether a person’s
emotional distress is caused by exposure to harassment or the presence 
of a psychiatric condition that causes mere perception of harassment.88 
Forensic psychiatrists and psychologists, however, generally claim to be
cognizant of the importance of staying within the bounds of their
expertise and professional guidelines. Thus, one commentator
discouraged forensic examiners from offering opinions beyond 
“whether the legally relevant incident . . . appears to have played a role 
in the claimant’s current mental injury” and added that experts “should
identify other contributing factors . . . [to] best reflect[] the clinical view
of causation and the limited ability of mental health professionals to
disaggregate ‘cause.’”89 Clinicians are also advised to restrict 
themselves to offering “more circumspect, less conclusory 
opinion[s] . . . [to] deter any tendency on the part of the legal decision-
maker to abdicate responsibility for analyzing the causation issue and 
applying the relevant legal construct.”90 
Many forensic examiners acknowledge that there are multiple
factors that may have bearing on one’s psychological well-being. 
However, they maintain that, so long as they have access to a wide and
deep range of background information about the subject, as well as an
opportunity to perform a forensic examination, they can render 
scientifically-based opinions regarding whether and to what extent 
certain events were causal agents of psychiatric conditions.91  Such  
opinions can then serve as evidence to support a factual determination 
of legal causation sufficient to allocate responsibility between the 
parties. Some commentators have developed analytical structures to 
assist forensic examiners in differentiating the various causal 
relationships (such as sole cause, major factor, aggravating factor, 
minor factor, and unrelated factor) between events and psychological 
injuries to encourage more precise use of the concept of causation.92 
86 Eric H. Marcus, Causation in Psychiatry: Realities and Speculations, 1983 MED. TRIAL
TECH. Q. 424, 428. 
87 Id.  Reasonable medical “certainty” or “probability” are terms used by some courts as
prerequisite to the admissibility of medical evidence, but they are increasingly falling out of use.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. e (Tentative
Draft No. 5, 2007). 
88 Marcus, supra note 86. 

89  MELTON ET AL., supra note 9, at 413. 

90 Id.
 
91 Gerald Young, Psychological Injury and Law: Assumptions and Foundations,
 
Controversies and Myths, Needed Directions, 1 PSYCHOL. INJ. & L. 11, 17 (2008) (arguing that 
the “myths” include that “causality, causation and related concepts are hopelessly confounded”
and that “even the most careful and comprehensive assessments cannot navigate the ‘quagmire’”).
92  MELTON ET AL., supra note 9, at 420; Schultz, supra note 67, at 110. 
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However, there is no single standard or generally accepted approach to 
reaching opinions on causation. 
One of the leading psychological commentators on the 
determinations of causation in the psychological and legal contexts, 
Izabela Z. Schultz, has noted that the philosophical conceptualizations
of causation do not easily translate into the medical-legal context.93  The
“concept of causality in the medico-legal evaluation is a foreign,
minefield-like territory” for most clinicians.94  The chief difficulty, she
observes, stems from the fact that “the legal concept of causality is
binary (yes, no) and linear (Event A causes Condition B), whereas the 
clinical concept of causality, consistent with the nature of inquiry in the 
behavioral sciences, is multifactorial, multifaceted and includes
interactions among various causative factors.”95  Thus, rather than
attempting to determine whether a specific event or agent was a 
substantial cause of a mental condition, “clinical causality determination
stipulates how co-existing and pre-existing factors interact with the 
injury factors.”96  The other primary difference between legal and 
clinical assessments of causation that Schultz notes is the relative levels
of “certainty or confidence with which statements and opinions can be 
rendered,” where a determination of “more likely than not” in the legal 
context would be considered “overly lenient” in the behavioral 
sciences.97 
In many instances, a forensic psychiatrist will attempt to determine
the presence of specific psychological conditions and mental disorders 
in the past, particularly at the time of the alleged incident in question in 
the litigation.  A pair of forensic psychologists explains that, in sexual
harassment cases, “[t]o determine causation of injury, the psychologist
must determine which conditions preexisted the alleged harassment,”98 
although they also note that a history of prior psychiatric diagnosis or 
prior trauma does not automatically establish an alternative cause for 
the current psychiatric difficulties.99 
93 Schultz, supra note 67, at 103. 
94 Id. at 104.  She also notes that the literature on causation in the “medico-legal and forensic
contexts” places an overemphasis on “malingering and secondary gain detection, thus creating an
impression that credibility assessment is at the core of causality determination.”  Id.
95 Id. at 106; see also Young, supra note 91, at 13 (“In mental health assessments, the 
multifactorial, biopsychosocial model serves to frame conclusions about causality.  The full range 
of possible influences is considered, including preexisting and secondary or unrelated ones, not 
only those related to the index event and subsequent course.” (internal citation omitted)).
96 Schultz, supra note 67, at 106. 
97 Id. at 107. 
98  WILLIAM E. FOOTE & JANE GOODMAN-DELAHUNTY, EVALUATING SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT: PSYCHOLOGICAL, SOCIAL, AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN FORENSIC
EXAMINATIONS 86 (2005); see also David R. Price, Clinical Evaluation and Case Formulation of 
Mental and Emotional Injury Claims, in  MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL INJURIES IN EMPLOYMENT
LITIGATION, supra note 22, at 72, 82-83, 85. 

99  FOOTE & GOODMAN-DELAHUNTY, supra note 98, at 134, 136-38, 201. 
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In short, when forensic psychiatrists and psychologists attempt to 
address the questions posed in litigation that bear on causation and 
liability, they take an inclusive “total person” approach to the 
question.100  They seek to acquire and assimilate as much information 
about the subject as possible including complete medical, psychiatric, 
and social histories.101  In the absence of this full picture, the conclusion 
is considered to be vulnerable to attack.102  As one psychiatrist notes:
“Failure to explore all aspects of an evaluee’s past and current history 
may prevent a credible evaluation of a variety of relevant psychological 
aspects of the legal issues in question. . . . Questions regarding 
alternative and proximate causation may also require evaluation of 
psychological, sexual, and trauma history.”103  She also observes that
“[l]egal relevance and psychological relevance are not equivalent
concepts” and that, for an examiner, “relevance” is something that 
cannot be determined until a full evaluation is complete.104 Examining 
psychiatrists, she argues, should have access to “all past and current 
medical and psychiatric records, even those that may ultimately not be
psychologically or legally relevant, to provide complete evaluations.”105 
As a result of these guiding principles, many forensic psychiatrists resist 
legal constraints that limit their access to information that would permit 
them “to determine all potential causative factors that may account for
some or all of the plaintiff’s psychological damages.”106  Some have
asserted that such information provides a “far more scientifically
accurate model of causation” which would better serve “the interests of 
justice.”107 
100  MELTON ET AL., supra note 9, at 415. 
101 See, e.g., id. at 414-15; Schultz, supra note 67, at 118-19 (discussing “best practices” for 
forensic examiners, including reviewing extensive information about the claimant-plaintiff and
making a “[c]areful determination of premorbid levels of functioning”). 
102  MELTON ET AL., supra note 9, at 415. 
103  LIZA H. GOLD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT: PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT 
LITIGATION 110 (2004); see also Albert M. Drukteinis, Understanding and Evaluating Mental
Damages, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Apr. 15, 2007, available at http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/
display/article/10168/55241 (“[A] critical factor  in making a proper diagnosis—and especially in
determining causation in mental damages claims—is a longitudinal life history. . . .  [The] onset 
of symptoms is an important consideration in order to objectify a mental damage claim.”). 
104  GOLD, supra note 103; see also Binder & McNiel, supra note 68, at 1193 (“In the medical 
care system, all evidence, including details about prior problems, is considered relevant to
understanding a patient and to providing appropriate culturally-sensitive care. In the legal
system, information is excluded if it is considered unfairly prejudicial.”). 
105  GOLD, supra note 103; see also FOOTE & GOODMAN-DELAHUNTY, supra note 98, at 86
(“When possible,” an examining psychologist should review records that “span the plaintiff’s
whole life and should include material from all providers, not just mental health practitioners.”).
106 See Mark I. Levy & Saul Rosenberg, The “Eggshell Plaintiff” Revised: Causation of 
Mental Damages in Civil Litigation, 27 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 204, 204
(2003); see also GOLD, supra note 103, at 114 (urging forensic examiners to “actively resist legal 
constraints on the scope or conduct of the psychiatric examination”). 
107 Levy & Rosenberg, supra note 106, at 206. 
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However, law differs from psychiatry in that it tends not to take a
comprehensive, inclusive approach to resolving questions of fact but, 
rather, makes determinations of which evidence is relevant before its 
presentation to the fact finder. Indeed, one of the key functions of a 
trial judge is to control what evidence the fact finder may consider,
rather than letting the fact finders make their own determinations of 
relevancy.  In this respect, American courts have not adopted the system 
of “free proof” advocated by Jeremy Bentham and his followers.108 
While evidence rules have increasingly favored admissibility,
permitting fact finders to determine the appropriate weight to assign 
evidence of questionable value and reliability, American law retains a 
rules-based system of evidence.  And evidence law is but one part of a 
rules-based legal system: “[L]egal rules are themselves inherently
exclusionary, and thus law is a pervasively exclusionary practice.”109 
Professor Frederick Shauer observed that “a central feature of law 
is its rule-based commitment to instructing its decision-makers that not
everything they believe material to making the best all-things-
considered decision is something they can take into consideration when
making a legal decision.”110  Evidence law exemplifies this feature.111 
The rules of evidence are keyed, in part, to the fact that the legal system
is a policy-based mechanism that allocates responsibility and, within 
trials, the risk of error.112  To this end, some evidence rules consider the 
broader or aggregate impact on wider society and are based upon 
concerns that go well beyond (or may even be in conflict with) the goal 
of factual accuracy in specific trials.113 There are also rules that address 
concerns about misuse of evidence by jurors, harassment of litigants in 
an adversarial proceeding, and even the wasting of time.114 
These conflicting systems of “relevancy” and distinct notions of 
causation—that is, the psychiatric and the legal—are inherently at odds
when fact finders consider questions of the legal causation of
psychological injuries.  It is at that juncture that courts must consider 
whether such fact finders may have access to the same kind of “whole 
person” evidence considered by forensic clinicians when arriving at 
108 Frederick Shauer, In Defense of Rule-Based Evidence Law . . . and Epistemology Too, 5
EPISTEME 295, 296-97 (2008). 
109 Id. at 300 (citing JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS IN LAW AND MORALITY
(1978)). 
110 Id. at 301. 
111 Id. 
112  ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 16 (2005) (“Apportionment of the risk of 
error [in trials] is a moral and political decision with far-reaching consequences.”).
113 Id. at 25. See generally Lisa Dufraimont, Evidence Law and the Jury: A Reassessment, 53 
MCGILL L.J. 199, 240 (2008) (reviewing the various rationales ascribed to evidence law and 
concluding that it is not possible to identify a single, unifying “organizing principle” for the 
various rules). 
114 See, e.g., FED R. EVID. 403, 611(a). 
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their determinations of liability. Under the guise of “alternate
causation” and relying upon the essentially unlimited complexity of the
development of psychological states, civil litigation defendants have 
been largely successful in placing highly prejudicial evidence about 
plaintiffs into the hands of fact finders. 
C. Admissibility of Expert Psychiatric Evidence on Causation 
Notwithstanding this backdrop of uncertainty within the field of
psychiatry regarding causation and the possibility of the introduction of 
prejudicial evidence, courts generally apply the basic rules of legal 
causation and apportionment to psychological injuries with little regard
for the risks of such prejudice. With few exceptions, courts admit 
expert psychiatric or psychological evidence offered by the parties on
the issue of causation of the plaintiff’s psychological injuries and permit 
the parties to argue causation and apportionment to the fact finder. 
As a general matter, in civil litigation determinations of causation 
can range from the clear-cut (e.g., a car runs a stop sign and collides
with another car resulting in property damage and injuries) to the 
complex, such as in the field of toxic torts.  At the complex end of the 
spectrum, plaintiffs rely in large part on the testimony of expert 
witnesses to provide evidentiary support for a finding of proximate 
cause. In many instances, juries have little independent basis to 
understand a causal relationship, such as that between pharmaceuticals
and rare birth defects. After Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,115 federal courts and many state courts have expanded
and refined their role as “gatekeepers” for the use of scientific and 
specialized evidence at trial.116  Indeed, all three cases recognized as the
“Daubert trilogy” concerned the admissibility of expert testimony on 
questions of causation in personal injury litigation.117 
Causation determinations where the plaintiff alleges psychological 
injury of some kind may be based upon a plaintiff’s description of her 
injuries, other lay testimony, expert testimony, or a combination of all 
of these.118  Allegations that go beyond a general description of an
115 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
116 David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, Daubert Trilogy in the States, 44 JURIMETRICS J.
351 (2004) (reviewing the various responses of state courts to the Daubert decision); Daniel W.
Shuman & Bruce D. Sales, The Impact of Daubert and Its Progeny on the Admissibility of 
Behavioral and Social Science Evidence, in PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURIES AT TRIAL, supra note 28, 
at 168, 169. 
117 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 
526 U.S. 137 (1999), complete the trilogy. 
118  DOBBS, supra note 35, at 832 (“[M]edical testimony is not ordinarily required to
demonstrate either the severity of the [emotional] distress or its cause.”); Jane Goodman-
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emotional reaction to an incident, and specifically, claims alleging
resulting psychopathology, generally require expert testimony.119  In  
cases involving psychological injuries, therefore, the parties frequently
offer expert testimony in support of or contrary to such claims,120 either 
through the plaintiff’s treating psychotherapist121 or through a forensic
psychiatrist who has been retained by the defendant to perform an 
examination of the plaintiff.122  Although clinicians and forensic
examiners testify frequently in civil trials, courts have failed to develop 
a coherent approach to determining admissibility of psychiatric
opinions. 
Expert testimony on the issue of causation of psychological 
injuries, whether offered by the plaintiff or defendant, must theoretically
comport with all rules that govern the admissibility of expert testimony
generally, including the applicable rules of evidence,123 as well as any 
additional requirements such as those outlined in the Daubert trilogy in 
the federal courts. Specifically, these rules require a finding that the 
proffered expert testimony must “assist” the fact finder, meaning that it 
must offer something beyond what the fact finders could glean for 
themselves from lay testimony.124  Further, expert opinions on causation
and the extent of damages, must, in theory, be based upon expertise, 
training, experience, recognized methodology, and the various other 
requirements set forth in evidence rules and the relevant case law.125 
Some commentators, however, have suggested that “overall,
Daubert has not resulted in changes in the admissibility of behavioral or
social science evidence.”126   Professor Christopher Slobogin has 
Delahunty & William E. Foote, Compensation for Pain, Suffering and Other Psychological 
Injuries: The Impact of Daubert on Employment Discrimination Claims, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 
183, 187 (1995). 
119 Drukteinis, supra note 103; Goodman-Delahunty & Foote, supra note 118, at 188-89. 
120 Schultz, supra note 67, at 102.  There are generally recognized ethical guidelines for 
forensic examiners developed by the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law and the 
American Psychology-Law Society.  Binder & McNiel, supra note 68, at 1197. 
121 But see Shuman, supra note 30, at 855 (“[A] psychiatrist treating a claimant should not 
serve as a forensic examiner for that claimant.” (citation omitted)); Stumo et al., supra note 66, at 
1313. Goodman-Delahunty & Foote, supra note 118, at 199 (“[A] consulting therapist who
provides testimony about causation in court runs a high risk of generating an impermissible dual
relationship with the client.”).
122 Goodman-Delahunty & Foote, supra note 118, at 187-89 (explaining various benefits of 
offering expert psychological testimony at trial in sexual harassment cases). 
123 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702. 
124 Id. (permitting admission of expert testimony only if it will “will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”); 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR 
JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 6262 (“The ‘assist’ requirement further 
demands that the expert’s testimony contribute something to the trier of fact’s considerations that
it could not itself supply.”). 
125  FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 592-94 (1993). 
126 Shuman & Sales, supra note 116, at 170; see also ZISKIN, supra note 84, at 270 (“[T]here 
are virtually no appellate court opinions denying admission of psychiatric opinion.”). 
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observed that courts have essentially grandfathered psychiatric evidence 
because it would invite trouble to subject it to a Daubert analysis,127 and 
the likely result would be the exclusion of evidence that had been 
routinely admitted prior to the Supreme Court’s decision.128  As noted in
the previous Part, although psychiatry is largely unconcerned with 
etiology, the sub-field of forensic psychiatry (and, correspondingly, the 
field of forensic psychology) does consider questions of causation.  The
causation determinations developed by the field of forensic psychiatry 
are sufficient in the eyes of the courts to permit the admission of 
psychiatric testimony on the issue of causation,129 including testimony 
from defendants’ experts regarding a plaintiff’s psychiatric history.130 
However, there are no recognized reliable standards or guidelines for 
evaluating causation of psychological injuries.131  Rather, “[a]n expert
opinion on these matters rendered in the court system is therefore often
based on an individual clinician’s personal belief as to what constitutes 
a reasonable answer to the causality question, rather than on any 
particular scientifically validated and/or clinically agreed upon 
methodology.”132 
Professor Daniel Shuman suggests that the context has been a 
factor in courts’ determinations of the admissibility of psychiatric 
evidence.133  Shuman draws a distinction between descriptive clinical 
testimony (especially by treating psychotherapists), which does not 
127  SLOBOGIN, supra note 5, at 28-29, 32-33.  Professor Slobogin also argues that courts 
should be more willing to admit such evidence offered in the context of a criminal defense. Id. at 
39-40. 
128 Bruce D. Sales & Daniel W. Shuman, Science, Experts, and Law: Reflections on the Past 
and the Future, in  EXPERT PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY FOR THE COURTS 9, 24-25 (Mark
Constanzo et al. eds., 2007) (noting “dilemma” faced by trial courts because applying Daubert
criteria “rigorously” to “clinical opinion testimony” would likely result in the exclusion of such 
evidence “leav[ing] the courts without expert guidance in deciding many kinds of cases . . . that to
date have relied upon clinical opinion experts”); Christopher Slobogin, The Admissibility of 
Behavioral Science Information in Criminal Trials from Primitivism to Daubert to Voice, 5 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 100, 101 (1999); see also Blanchard v. Eli Lilly & Co., 207 F. Supp.
2d 308, 316-17 (D. Vt. 2002) (noting that it would have to exclude plaintiff’s expert’s testimony
if it were to apply the Daubert requirements and therefore opting to evaluate the reliability under
a different approach); Stumo et al., supra note 66, at 1319 (“There is a danger that because
psychiatric/psychological expert testimony has been generally admitted in the past, opposing 
lawyers may become complacent about challenging the expert’s qualifications or opinions and 
judges may freely admit their testimony.”).
 129 Daniel W. Shuman & Jennifer L. Hardy, Causation, Psychology, and Law, in CAUSALITY 
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURY, supra note 34, at 517, 537 (noting that the few reported decisions 
regarding “psychological or psychiatric evidence of causation for psychological harm” indicate
that courts are not inclined to demand “rigorous scientific proof” before admitting such evidence).
 130 See id.
131 Schultz, supra note 67, at 102.  As noted in MELTON ET AL., supra note 9, at 418, a number 
of “specialized instruments designed to aid in the diagnosis” of PTSD have been developed. 
However, apparently none has emerged as a standard tool. 
132 Schultz, supra note 67, at 102.
133 Shuman & Sales, supra note 116, at 172. 
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implicate Daubert, and specific causal attribution (such as that which 
often arises in testimony offered by forensic specialists), which does or 
at least should do so.134  As some commentators have noted: “Courts
may be reluctant to exclude pure, nonscientific clinical opinion
testimony in fear that doing so would preclude too many litigants from
having their day in court.”135  However, there are no generally 
recognized principles in the case law used to differentiate such “pure, 
nonscientific clinical” opinions from others in forensic psychiatry or
psychology.136 
Courts rely largely upon a proffered expert’s credentials and
clinical experience—neither of which is among the factors expressly 
suggested in the Daubert trilogy as appropriate indicators of
reliability—as the essential bases to admit or exclude expert testimony
on causation of psychological injury.137  Thus, in Ferris v. Pennsylvania
Federation Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, the trial
court excluded the testimony of the plaintiff’s treating medical doctor
on the issues of diagnosis and causation of psychiatric injury, as well as 
plaintiff’s own testimony on these issues, as neither had training in
psychiatry.138  Similarly, in Hahn v. Minnesota Beef Industries, the
court granted the defendant’s motion in limine to exclude the testimony
of the plaintiff’s treating psychotherapist who had diagnosed her with
major depressive disorder and anxiety NOS (not otherwise specified) 
134 Shuman & Hardy, supra note 129, at 540-43; see also, e.g., SLOBOGIN, supra note 5, at 28-
29 (noting that clinical psychiatric testimony is usually “left alone” because courts assume that 
jurors “will naturally treat it with skepticism” and “know what to do with it”); Noah, supra note 
67, at 265 (“Disputes about medical causation typically pose scientific (usually epidemiological) 
questions subject to these strictures, but courts tend to review diagnostic (clinical) judgments 
about the nature of particular patients’ injuries under more forgiving standards.” (citation
omitted)).
135  BRUCE D. SALES & DANIEL W. SHUMAN, EXPERTS IN COURT: RECONCILING LAW,
SCIENCE, AND PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE 94 (2005); see also Campbell, supra note 65, at 442
(“Applying [the Daubert criteria] to the DSM-IV leads to rather sobering conclusions regarding 
its evidentiary reliability.”).
136 See also, e.g., Henry F. Fradella et al., The Impact of Daubert on the Admissibility of
Behavioral Science Testimony, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 403, 423-25 (2003) (concluding, based upon
empirical research, that courts generally admit expert psychological testimony on the issue of
emotional distress in the absence of “methodological flaws” in assessing such distress); Haney & 
Smith, supra note 66, at 197 (“[I]t is difficult to discern any categorical rules or universally 
compelling logic from the Supreme Court’s expert testimony trilogy that would allow us to 
predict how evidence concerning psychological injury is likely to be handled by most courts most
of the time.”).
137 Shuman & Sales, supra note 116, at 176; see also Goodman-Delahunty & Foote, supra
note 118, at 199 (suggesting that Daubert’s emphasis on the role of courts in assessing scientific 
trustworthiness will “increase the emphasis on the specific qualifications of the expert to render
the proffered testimony” (citation omitted)).  The Daubert opinion, however, provided that the list 
of considerations was non-exhaustive.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593-95
(1993).
138 Ferris v. Pa. Fed’n Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees, 153 F. Supp. 2d 736, 743-46 (E.D. 
Pa. 2001). 
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but whose report and other records did not specifically analyze 
causation.139 The court further ruled that because “[d]epression and 
anxiety disorder are complex injuries, requiring expert (as opposed to 
lay) testimony regarding diagnosis and causation,” and because the 
proffered expert testimony was excluded, “the Court will exclude all
evidence of Hahn’s alleged emotional distress from the jury.”140 
A significant problem with respect to the reliability of expert
psychiatric or psychological testimony—but one that is rarely the basis
for exclusion of such testimony—is the high risk of bias in arriving at 
opinions.141  In the absence of clear standards for the determination of 
causation and the reliance on subjective assessment and “clinical 
judgment” in the inherently adversarial context of litigation, there is
great potential for bias in the rendering of expert opinions on 
causation.142 Specifically, there is a risk of “information bias” as a
result of the referral source (often a plaintiff’s or defendant’s
attorney).143  Also “confirmatory bias” can occur when examiners 
develop initial hypotheses (perhaps suggested by the referral source) for 
causation which then influence the way in which the examiner considers 
the information reviewed when rendering a final opinion on the 
potential causes of an individual’s psychopathology.144  For example,
some have suggested that an over-diagnosis of PTSD in individuals
with a history of some kind of trauma, such as a motor vehicle accident 
139 Hahn v. Minn. Beef Indus., No. Civ. 002282, 2002 WL 32658476, at *2-3 (D. Minn. May 
29, 2002).  There are several difficulties with the use of treating psychotherapists to render
opinions on causation, and several commentators have suggested that such a role is likely
improper or at least unadvisable.  See Binder & McNeil, supra note 68, at 1197. 
140 Hahn, 2002 WL 32658476, at *3. 
141  GOLD, supra note 103, at 37-39; Niall Crumlish & Brendan D. Kelly, How Psychiatrists
Think, 15 ADVANCES IN PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT 72, 74-78 (2009); Randy K. Otto, Bias and
Expert Testimony of Mental Health Professionals in Adversarial Proceedings: A Preliminary
Investigation, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 267, 268 (1989) (“Insofar as it may go unnoticed by
professionals because of its subtlety, unconscious or indeliberate bias may pose an even greater
threat to the administration of justice than its purposeful counterpart.”). 
142 See ZISKIN, supra note 84, at 195-203 (reviewing studies evaluating the limitations of
“clinical judgment”); Campbell, supra note 65, at 440-41 (arguing that research supports a
conclusion that “clinical judgments of psychologists and psychiatrists [during the diagnostic
process] are too often seriously flawed” and that such judgments “frequently rest on intuitive
impressions that reveal more about themselves than the patients they evaluate”); David Faust & 
Jay Ziskin, The Expert Witness in Psychology and Psychiatry, SCIENCE, July 1988, at 31, 33-34 
(listing several factors that limit clinical judgment of psychiatrists and psychologists in forensic
settings); Stone, supra note 82 (“[E]very psychiatrist thinks he/she has very good clinical
judgment. . . . [I]f forensic psychiatrists limited themselves to the standards of bench
scientists . . . their lips would be sealed in the courtroom.”). 
143 Schultz, supra note 67, at 105; ZISKIN, supra note 84, at 399-400. 
144 Schultz, supra note 67, at 120; see also, e.g., MELTON ET AL., supra note 9, at 418 
(“[R]esearch indicates that when evaluations focus on past mental states (which is always the case
in . . . emotional injury cases), estimates of pathology are inflated . . . .”); ZISKIN, supra note 84, 
at 232-45. 
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or assault, may be attributable to confirmatory bias.145  Thus, despite the 
presence of “high professional confidence levels” demonstrated by
clinicians when offering expert opinions, Professor Schultz cautions that 
“causality determination in personal injury and workers’ compensation
contexts constitutes research activity with a sample size of one, with 
serious, inherent methodological limitations and generous room for 
misattribution and error.”146  However, as a general matter, courts 
regard questions of bias and judgment as fodder for cross-examination,
rather than as bases for exclusion, although it is unlikely that the tool 
could effectively reveal such limitations in psychiatric expert 
opinions.147 
Thus, despite widespread controversy within the field of
psychiatry, courts generally admit expert psychiatric testimony by either 
party on the issue of causation of psychological injuries.  It is notable 
that there are few cases discussing the issue of reliability in the context
of a defendant’s use of psychiatric evidence.  This may be because a 
defendant often will not (and cannot) use such evidence where a
plaintiff does not herself offer evidence of causation and thus a plaintiff
is not generally in a position to challenge the evidence.  It may also be
that some courts simply apply more scrutiny to plaintiffs’ use of 
evidence.148  Indeed, by granting plaintiffs great latitude to offer expert
psychiatric evidence in support of their claims, courts appear
constrained to permit defendants nearly limitless use of psychiatric 
evidence in rebuttal. As a result, courts fail to consider the particular
dangers presented by the admission of expert psychiatric testimony on
the issue of alternative sources of causation. 
145 Williams J. Koch, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Following Motor Vehicle Accidents: 
Clinical Forensic Guidelines, in  PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURIES AT TRIAL, supra note 28, 794, 803-
04; see also Marilyn L. Bowman, Problems Inherent to the Diagnosis of Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder, in  PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURIES AT TRIAL, supra note 28, at 820, 834-35 (describing
other potential biases in the diagnosis of PTSD).
146 Schultz, supra note 67, at 106. 
147 See, e.g., Bachir v. Transoceanic Cable Ship Co., No. 98 Civ. 4625, 2002 WL 413918, at
*8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2002) (“Any shortcoming of a[n expert] witness’s actual testimony in a 
particular area is a subject for cross-examination, not a ground for exclusion under rule 702.”);
see also Steven R. Smith, Mental Health Witnesses: Of Science and Crystal Balls, 7 BEHAV. SCI.
& L. 145, 164-65 (1989) (noting “heavy reliance” of courts on cross-examination for assessing
mental health testimony and the particular limitations of the technique in challenging the bases of 
clinical judgment). 
148 In the lower court proceedings discussed in Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 
1295-97 (8th Cir. 1997), the trial court expressed emphatic skepticism of the use of psychological 
evidence on the issue of causation of psychological harm, while nonetheless admitting and 
crediting the expert testimony offered by the defendants on the same issue. 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010] DISORDERED A N D DISC RE DITE D PLAINTIFF  777 

D. Alternative Causation and “Door-Opening”
Defense counsel echo forensic psychiatrists when they argue that,
given that anything in one’s life may have an impact on the 
development of emotional distress, courts should admit at trial a wide 
range of evidence suggesting alternative causation of damages where a 
plaintiff alleges psychological injuries.  Courts consider exploration of
other causes of psychological injury to be fair and appropriate routes to
counter expert psychiatric opinions that support a plaintiff’s claim for
emotional distress damages.149  Thus, in order to assess the plaintiff’s
claim and the defendant’s response, these courts reason that the jury
itself must have direct access to evidence of any and all other potential 
factors that could have played a role in the development of a 
psychological injury. 
Courts’ rationale when admitting evidence of a plaintiff’s
psychiatric history is usually something to the effect that the plaintiff
has “opened the door” to such evidence by making a claim for
psychological injuries, particularly but not necessarily when the plaintiff
offers testimony of a treating psychotherapist or forensic examiner.150 
Many courts adopting this reasoning are quite willing to permit 
discovery and admission at trial of a range of evidence that may suggest 
other “stressors” or sources of emotional distress, including prior or
concurrent psychiatric illnesses, sexual trauma, marital problems, and 
the like.151  As noted in a forensic psychology treatise: “The ‘total
149 See, e.g., Moore v. Chertoff, Civ. A. No. 00-953, 2006 WL 1442447, at *1-3 (D.D.C. May 
22, 2006); Owens v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 221 F.R.D. 657, 659-60 (D. Kan. June 2, 2004); 
Bujnicki v. Am. Paving & Excavating, Inc., No. 99-CV-0646S, 2004 WL 1071736, at *18-19
(W.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2004).
150 See, e.g., McCleland v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 95-C-23, 1995 WL 571324, at *1-2 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 1995) (holding that evidence of a plaintiff’s prior psychological treatment was 
admissible on issue of causation even where she makes no claim for exacerbation of preexisting 
injury).
151 See, e.g., Maday v. Pub. Libraries of Saginaw, 480 F.3d 815, 821 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming
admission of treatment notes that referenced the plaintiff’s feelings about her attorney and the 
litigation, reasoning that such notes suggested an alternative cause of emotional distress);
Gretzinger v. Univ. of Haw. Prof’l Assembly, No. 97-15123, 156 F.3d 1236 (Table), 1998 WL 
403357, at *1-2 (9th Cir. July 7, 1998) (affirming admission of evidence of plaintiff’s prior rape 
and homosexuality based upon a finding of relevance to PTSD and damages claim because it
revealed other potential sources of distress, which was probative of her emotional state, and the 
trial court gave limiting instruction that it was not character evidence); Nichols v. Am. Nat’l Ins.
Co., 154 F.3d 875, 884-85 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming admission of  evidence of abortion because 
plaintiff was Catholic, and therefore her abortion was a possible alternative cause of emotional 
distress); Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 981 F. Supp. 1406, 1408-09 (D.N.M. 1997) (ruling that 
discovery regarding plaintiff’s sexual history may be relevant to the issue of damages, but only to 
the extent that such sexual contact caused pain and suffering).  Some cases require consideration
of the applicability of Federal Rule of Evidence 412 which excludes evidence of sexual history in
certain cases. See, e.g., Delaney v. City of Hampton, 999 F. Supp. 794, 796 (E.D. Va. 1997)
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person’ of the claimant will be considered when the claim for damages
is adjudicated.”152  Thus, for example, in York v. American Telephone &
Telegraph Co., the appeals court held that the trial court correctly 
admitted testimony of the plaintiff’s prior psychiatric hospitalization,
along with evidence of her marital and financial problems.153  The court
reasoned that the jury must be permitted to consider such evidence of 
causation where a plaintiff seeks damages for emotional distress.154 
The use of evidence of a plaintiff’s psychiatry history at trial is no
doubt far greater than the published case law suggests because 
controversies regarding the relevance of such evidence often arise
during the discovery stage, albeit with the questions framed slightly
differently.  For instance, in my recent review of the law of implied
waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, I noted the significant 
number of decisions in which courts concluded that a plaintiff had 
waived such privilege merely by asserting a claim for emotional distress 
damages.155  These courts reason that such claims entitle defendants to
present evidence of any alternative causes of such emotional distress 
and, therefore, that such defendants are entitled to discover evidence of 
a plaintiff’s prior psychiatric history.  The extensive case law on this 
discovery issue demonstrates the prevalence of this practice by civil 
defendants and signals the general willingness of courts to admit such
evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 401’s broad conceptualization
of relevance.156  It may be that the courts’ indication that such evidence 
is not only subject to discovery but also ultimately admissible at trial 
may well discourage plaintiffs from pursuing their claims to trial, or at 
least from further contesting the relevancy of the evidence.157 
Indeed, one can see how the broader the view of the plaintiff’s pre-
event state that one considers, the less solid the link between the 
psychological injury and the event appears to be.  One psychologist 
noted that: 
(ruling on a motion in limine that evidence from plaintiff’s psychiatric file indicating numerous 
stressors in her life besides the alleged incident, including a history of sex abuse, was “highly 
probative” as to both liability and damages and therefore admissible notwithstanding Rule 412).
152  MELTON ET AL., supra note 9, at 415 (citation omitted).
153 York v. AT&T Co., 95 F.3d 948, 957-58 (10th Cir. 1996). 
154 Id. 
155 Smith, supra note 6, at 107-11, 114-21; see, e.g., Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 
562, 569 (S.D. Cal. 1999). 
156  FED. R. EVID. 401 (“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.”). 
157 As a general matter, evidentiary rulings are the subject of reported opinions in only a very
small number of cases, such as where courts issue written decisions in pre-trial motions in limine
or where evidentiary issues are addressed in bench trial opinions or post-judgment motions. 
Evidentiary issues are even rarer in appeals court opinions. Therefore, case law developed in the
discovery context serves as guidance for courts and parties on admissibility issues.
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Life events occur as part of a continuous stream in which acts, 
thoughts, and emotions are all events that can function
simultaneously as stimulus, personal interpretation, response, and 
outcome, depending upon where the clinician sets the starting point.
Causal explanations of PTSD try to pull out a specific unit of life that
is set to begin with an event and end with a mental disorder
(response) so it can be understood in a causal way.158 
Thus, “[u]se of a longer perspective,” as is often attempted by
defendants, “may show that focusing on that short-term event-PTSD 
unit distorts the meaning and diagnosis of the distress.”159 
In light of this consideration, plaintiffs in personal injury cases
generally aim to present a narrow, packaged view of their mental health,
introducing into the trial record only as much evidence as is needed to 
show the extent of damages and a link to the defendants’ conduct.160 
Conversely, defendants want to provide fact finders with a broader 
scope of evidence about potential causes of psychological injuries due 
to two strategic benefits. First, the more stressor-laden the plaintiff’s 
history is, the easier it becomes for the defendant to show that the 
emotional impact of its conduct was minimal.  And by offering selected
portions of the plaintiff’s history as potential alternative causes, the
defendant may gain an added benefit by raising questions or doubts
about the plaintiff’s credibility and perhaps character, as discussed 
further infra in Parts II and III.  Thus, defendants are alert to any 
potential opportunities to argue that the plaintiff’s own litigation
strategies have permitted added scrutiny of the plaintiff herself.161 
As a general matter of evidence law, courts base this “door
opening” reasoning upon considerations of fairness and an assumption
that permitting one kind of evidence properly balances or answers the 
evidence previously admitted to facilitate the truth-seeking functions of
trials.162  Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1), for example, a
criminal defendant’s offer of evidence as to his peaceful character opens 
158 Bowman, supra note 145, at 832. 
159 Id.
160 See James J. McDonald, Jr., Preface to MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL INJURIES IN 
EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION, at xxxvii (James J. McDonald, Jr. ed., 2d ed. 2008 Cumulative Supp.)
(noting that plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases are increasingly foregoing the use of
mental health experts, and instead relying on their own testimony exclusively to establish
emotional distress damages to avoid being subjected to Rule 35 examinations and other discovery
of potential alternative stressors).
161 For example, in Brocuglio v. Proulx, 478 F. Supp. 2d 309 (D. Conn. 2007), the trial court 
permitted defense counsel to inquire about the plaintiff’s prior involuntary civil commitment
during cross-examination of the plaintiff’s psychological expert.  Id. at 329. The court had ruled
prior to trial that the evidence of the commitment would not be admissible unless the “door was 
opened,” and apparently concluded that such door-opening requirement was satisfied when the
psychologist testified about his examination of the plaintiff.  Id. at 329-30. 
162 1  CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 1:12 (3d
ed. 2008). 
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the door to evidence of his less-than-peaceful character, which would 
otherwise be inadmissible.163  Indeed, some commentators have
criticized courts’ lack of scrutiny of the underlying admissibility of the 
“counterproof,” often resulting in the admission of improper character
evidence or other prejudicial evidence.164 Moreover, in the context of 
preexisting conditions and alternative causation, courts fail to consider 
whether the evidence offered by each party truly amounts to two sides
of the same question or in fact presents two entirely distinct
questions.165  It may well be that the complex nature of psychological
causation and the claims of forensic psychiatrists that a wide range of 
events and conditions can be the underlying cause mask the distinction.
Once a court agrees that the door is opened on the question of causation,
it is difficult to set limits on what evidence concerning the plaintiff’s 
past is not arguably probative of causation. 
For example, in an excessive force case, Bemben v. Hunt, the trial
court admitted evidence of the plaintiff’s prior diagnosis of “organic 
delusional disorder with symptoms of paranoid ideations and irrational 
behavior” three years prior to the incident, as well as evidence of his 
preexisting and ongoing treatment for depression.166   However, the
plaintiff did not allege any specific psychiatric injury; rather, she sought 
damages only for “mental suffering which normally ensues from being 
arrested and/or physically abused.”167   Indeed, in a significant number
of cases discussing the relevance of a plaintiff’s psychiatric history to a 
defendant’s theory of alternative causes of emotional distress, courts 
have been willing to grant defendants broad access to the records of 
prior psychiatric treatment, notwithstanding the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege.168  Courts generally base these rulings upon an assumption 
that, because a plaintiff has included a claim for emotional distress 
damages, such evidence is essential or vital to a defendant’s trial
163  FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
164  MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 162. As this treatise observes, many courts regard
the basic purpose of the “open door doctrine” as admitting evidence that would be otherwise
excludable but for the “waiver” of any potential objections by the party offering the initial proof.
Id. at n.3 (citing Itin v. Ungar, 17 P.3d 129, 132 n.4 (Colo. 2000)).
165 Lewis R. Hagood, Claims of Mental and Emotional Damages in Employment
Discrimination Cases, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 577, 588 (1999) (“[A] plaintiff’s prior psychological 
impairment may be more of a shield than a sword on the issue of damages, but not necessarily
regarding liability.”).
166 Bemben v. Hunt, No. 93-C-509, 1995 WL 27223, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 1995). 
167 Id. at *3.  This would suggest that the plaintiff did not offer any expert psychiatric evidence 
herself.
168 See, e.g., Owens v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 221 F.R.D. 657 (D. Kan. 2004); Wynne v.
Loyola Univ. of Chicago, No. 97-C-06417, 1999 WL 759401 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1999); Kirchner 
v. Mitsui & Co., 184 F.R.D. 124, 129 (M.D. Tenn. 1998); Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 
F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1997); see also Smith, supra note 6, at 114-19 (critiquing courts’ use of 
notions of “fairness” and “truth-seeking” when finding that a plaintiff has waived the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege by asserting a claim for emotional distress damages). 
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strategy, and therefore denying access to the records would be
fundamentally unfair. 
By contrast, some courts scrutinize defendants’ arguments before 
admitting evidence of alleged alternate stressors. In Rettiger v. IBP, 
Inc., for example, the court deferred ruling until trial on the 
admissibility of evidence proffered by the defendant to show preexisting
causes of the plaintiff’s emotional distress but noted that, by making a 
claim for emotional distress, the plaintiff had opened the door on the 
issue of alternative stressors.169  The court explained that it would need
to determine if there was a reasonable basis to conclude that these 
alleged stressors could contribute to emotional distress.170  Similarly, in 
Mendez v. Superior Court, a defendant unsuccessfully sought discovery
of the plaintiff’s extramarital affairs to make an alternative causation
argument.171 The court rejected the request on several grounds,
including a lack of expert psychological evidence that infidelity can 
lead to emotional distress.172 
The decisions in Rettinger and Mendez, in contrast to the approach
taken by most trial courts, underscore that courts can apply real scrutiny
to rebuttal evidence offered by a defendant.  While the stated basis for 
the discovery and admission of evidence of a plaintiff’s psychiatric 
illness to rebut a claim for emotional distress damages appears, in the 
abstract, to be fair and reasonable, there can be little question but that
such evidence can benefit a defendant.  Specifically, the evidence may
cast doubt on the plaintiff’s assertion of causation of injury, while at the 
same time, casting the plaintiff herself in a negative light due to the
stigmatizing effects of psychiatric diagnoses.  Courts should consider 
whether it is fair to characterize the proof as “counter-proof” or whether 
the effect of such evidence would go beyond simply neutralizing the 
probative effect of the plaintiff’s evidence.  Similarly, a defendant’s
evidence cannot leave fact finders to make purely speculative inferences 
about psychological functioning. 
E. Quantification and Apportionment by Fact Finders 
The cases in which defendants succeed in presenting evidence of a
plaintiff’s preexisting or concurrent mental disorder also raise the 
question of how courts understand fact finders to use psychiatric 
evidence to quantify the causation of psychological injuries under the 
often complex rules of apportionment.  Quantification of damages is
169 Rettiger v. IBP, No. 96-4015-SAC, 1999 WL 318153, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 6, 1999).
 
170 Id. at *3-4.
 
171 Mendez v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 3d 557, 561-63 (Ct. App. 1988). 

172 Id. at 570-71. 
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one of the most challenging tasks of fact finders.  And while courts 
show little reluctance to admit evidence on multiple and competing
theories of causation of psychiatric injuries, they appear to give little
regard to whether fact finders properly use such evidence in making
apportionment determinations. 
This issue of apportionment implicates the extensive debate among
legal scholars regarding the legal principles that permit a party to 
recover money for “noneconomic” damages, including those intended to
compensate a party for emotional distress and other psychological 
injuries. Professor Margaret Jane Radin described one dimension of the 
debate in terms of the “commodification” of noneconomic damages. 173 
The absence of an accurate basis to assess psychological injury was one 
of the reasons that courts were initially resistant to allowing recovery 
for such injuries at all.174  The traditional and still-predominant view is
that even though such harm is essentially incommensurable, the 
argument that such incommensurability points in favor of the abolition 
of such damages should be rejected.175  Most courts and scholars have
concluded that it is better to offer some form of payment than no
payment at all.176  As the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
noted: 
When . . . the tort causes bodily harm or emotional distress, the law 
cannot restore the injured person to his previous position. The
sensations caused by harm to the body or by pain or humiliation are
not in any way analogous to a pecuniary loss, and a sum of money is 
not the equivalent of peace of mind.  Nevertheless, damages given
for pain and humiliation are called compensatory.  They give to the 
injured person some pecuniary return for what he has suffered or is 
173 See Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56 (1993). 
174 Call, supra note 28, at 40. 
175 Radin, supra note 173, at 75-76.  For example, Professor Ronald Allen and his colleagues 
have argued that our current legal system does not demand rational fact-based decision-making 
by jurors with respect to noneconomic compensatory damages, which would include damages for 
psychological injuries (beyond the costs of treatment).  They go so far as to suggest that such 
awards are based upon the subjective beliefs of jurors rather than on the rule of law, running afoul 
of the Due Process Clause.  Ronald J. Allen et al., An External Perspective on the Nature of 
Noneconomic Compensatory Damages and Their Regulation, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1249, 1264-77 
(2007); see also Richard Abel, General Damages Are Incoherent, Incalculable, 
Incommensurable, and Inegalitarian (but Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 253, 325-
26 (2006); Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of 
Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163, 208-09 (2004).  Other arguments against emotional distress
damages assert that payment of such damages amounts to commodification and “leads to a
degradation of personhood and an inferior conception of human flourishing.”  Radin, supra note 
173, at 84.  Radin also reviews some of the proposed alternatives to the present system of 
determining emotional distress damages. Id. at 80-81. 
176 Radin, supra note 173, at 70-72; see also Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort 
Reform: Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1313-14 (2004) (demonstrating
from empirical research that caps on noneconomic damages have a disproportionate impact on
women, the young, and the old whose injuries are less likely to be measured in economic terms). 
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likely to suffer.  There is no scale by which the detriment caused by 
suffering can be measured and hence there can be only a very rough 
correspondence between the amount awarded as damages and the 
extent of the suffering.177 
Thus, these payments serve goals other than compensation—such as 
providing solace to victims, recognition for their rights, redress, and so 
forth—and, viewed in this regard, precision in calculation appears less 
critical.178 
Some research suggests that jurors struggle with jury instructions
regarding noneconomic damages, including when apportionment is
required.179 As one commentator has noted: “Irrespective of the
instructions’ treatment of the elements of damages, jury instructions 
provide jurors with no guidance in the manner by which they are to 
convert their perceptions of the plaintiff’s condition into a dollar
award.”180  In essence, when we ask jurors to apportion emotional 
distress damages between those caused by the defendant’s conduct and
those caused by a psychiatric condition (or any potential alternative
cause), we ask them to calculate a specific measure where there is no
scale. Admissibility of evidence of multiple causes of psychological 
injuries operates within the legal fiction that fact finders can accurately
and precisely incorporate such evidence into the final calculation of
loss. 
In some cases where a court sits as fact finder, it will base its
damages award on an amount it determines to reflect the extent of
plaintiff’s injuries that are attributable to the defendant’s conduct aside
from preexisting causes of emotional distress.  In the opinions issued in
these cases, we get a glimpse of the challenge of attaching dollar figures
to these analyses. For example, in McKinnon v. Kwong Wah
Restaurant, the trial court noted that it had difficulty determining the
various causes of the plaintiffs’ emotional distress but ultimately
concluded that an award of $2500 for each plaintiff in that sexual
harassment case was “appropriate.” An appeals court upheld the 
finding.181 
177  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a (1979) (emphasis added). 
178 See Radin, supra note 173, at 70-75. 
179 See, e.g., NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 276 (2007) 
(discussing the eggshell skull rule).
180 Roselle L. Wissler et al., Instructing Jurors on General Damages in Personal Injury 
Cases: Problems and Possibilities, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 712, 718 (2000); see also
VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 179, at 277 (noting that juries are sometimes reluctant to award 
noneconomic damages because proof of such harm “rest[s] almost exclusively on plaintiffs’
reports of their internal states of pain or emotional trauma”). However, the extent of jurors’ 
comprehension of current instructions has been subjected to little empirical testing.
181 McKinnon v. Kwong Wah Rest., 83 F.3d 498, 506-07 (1st Cir. 1996).  Similarly, in Salas 
v. United States, 974 F. Supp. 202, 206-07 (W.D.N.Y. 1997), a car accident case brought under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, both parties offered extensive psychiatric evidence regarding 
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Courts differ in their approach to assessing juries’ determinations 
of apportionment and causation of psychological injuries.  In Carter v. 
Blakey, a sexual harassment case, the plaintiff’s psychiatric expert 
conceded that the “original source” of the plaintiff’s PTSD was sexual 
abuse by the plaintiff’s father and that she could not quantify the extent 
to which such trauma contributed to the plaintiff’s emotional harm.182 
The trial court rejected the defendant’s argument that such testimony 
amounted to a failure of proof of causation for the plaintiff.183  Instead, 
the court permitted the jury’s verdict for the plaintiff to stand, reasoning
that, if the extent to which other stressors contributed to her emotional 
distress was not really quantifiable, the defendant could be held liable 
so long as there was any evidence of direct causation between the 
defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s harm.184 
By contrast, other trial courts have reduced plaintiffs’ emotional 
distress jury awards in the face of evidence of other psychological
problems, yet they offer no insight into their reasoning.  For example in
Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., a sexual harassment case, the trial 
court cut a jury’s $500,000 award in half on the basis of evidence 
presented at trial that the plaintiff had other stressors in her life and that 
she sought no treatment for her emotional distress.185  In  Hurley v. 
Atlantic City Police Department, another sexual harassment case, a trial 
court granted a defendant’s post-trial motion for remittitur reducing the 
plaintiff’s compensatory damages award from $575,000 to $175,000
due in large part to evidence that she had “emotional difficulties” prior 
to her employment by the defendant.186 
A few courts have issued opinions suggesting that they lack
confidence in jurors’ ability to appropriately use evidence of alternate
causation of emotional distress to reach a just apportionment of
damages and therefore restrict defendants’ proffer of such evidence on 
causation and the plaintiff’s prior mental illness. After a bench trial, the court concluded that the 
accident had caused the plaintiff’s somatoform disorder and the defendant had not established that
the psychiatric symptoms were inevitable due to her preexisting personality disorder and other
psychiatric diagnoses. Id. at 208-09; see also Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 1273 
(D.D.C. 1988) (rejecting defendant’s psychiatric expert witness on issue of exacerbation of
plaintiff’s preexisting psychiatric condition). 
182 Carter v. Blakey, No. 1:97CV00982, 1999 WL 1937226, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 1, 1999). 
183 Id. at *7. 
184 Id.; see also Steinhauser v. Hertz, 421 F.2d 1169, 1173-74 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that jury 
was “ideally suited” for resolving the “taxing” question of whether the plaintiff’s “latent 
psychotic tendencies” were bound to worsen or were triggered as a result of the motion vehicle
accident that was the subject of the litigation).
185 Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 731, 737-38 (D.N.J. 1998). 
186 Hurley v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 933 F. Supp. 396, 425 (D.N.J. 1996), aff’d in part on 
other grounds, 174 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1074 (2000); see also
Merriweather v. Family Dollar Stores of Ind., 103 F.3d 576, 581 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that in a 
bench trial, a trial court should have remitted twenty-five percent of the plaintiff’s damages award 
due to other stressors in her life).
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relevancy grounds.  In the Mendez v. Superior Court opinion, discussed
supra, the appeals court noted: “[W]e have difficulty accepting the 
defendants’ basic notion that plaintiff’s claimed injury of severe 
emotional distress is somehow apportionable between preexisting
anxieties and the mental trauma caused by the defendants’ alleged
conduct.”187  The court noted that, under such logic, anything in the
plaintiff’s life (financial, medical, family) could have been the source of 
emotional distress.188  Since emotional distress is a component of any 
sexual harassment case, it feared that permitting such extensive and
invasive discovery whenever such distress is alleged would have a 
chilling effect on such claims.189 
Similarly, in Robinson v. Canon, a sexual harassment case, the trial 
court excluded any reference to the plaintiff’s alleged extramarital
affairs and rejected the defendant’s alternative causation argument.190 
As did the appeals court in Mendez, the Robinson court considered the 
assumption that extramarital affairs are a source of emotional distress to 
be mere speculation.  More significantly, the court did not see how a 
fact finder could segregate and differentiate such stress from the 
emotional distress experienced by the plaintiff due to the defendant’s
conduct.191  The trial court conceded that “it may be impossible for any 
defendant to satisfy this burden because psychological considerations 
are not subject to such nice categorizations.”192 Without a real basis for 
apportionment, the court concluded, the defendants could not “simply 
present evidence of alleged stressors and leave it to the jury to 
determine whether, and to what extent, the emotional damage
attributable to Plaintiff’s various stress factors is divisible.” 193 
These cases exploring various aspects of apportionment of
psychological injury reveal the challenges faced by fact finders— 
whether judges or jurors—in arriving at results that appear to be closely 
linked with the conflicting evidence presented by the parties on 
questions of causation of psychological injuries.  Indeed, we should not 
be surprised given the reluctance of clinicians to arrive at causation
187 Mendez v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 3d 557, 571 (Ct. App. 1988). 
188 See id. at 573. 

189 Id. 

190 Robinson v. Canon, No. 99-0339-CV-W-3, 2000 WL 564203 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 6, 2000). 

191 Id.
 
192 Id.  The court commented that it felt constrained to rule as it did by the reasoning in Jenson
 
v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287 (8th Cir. 1997).  In that opinion, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that, because the special master at the trial level had held that
the plaintiffs’ emotional distress injuries in that class action sexual harassment case were
indivisible, the trial court had improperly considered evidence of the plaintiffs’ medical and
sexual histories. Id. at 1294. 
193 Robinson, 2000 WL 564203.  The court also concluded that such evidence was excludable
under Rule 403 since it raised an inference that the plaintiff was a bad person. 
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conclusions themselves.194 These challenges may suggest to some that
noneconomic damages should be jettisoned as a form of relief.
However, such challenges are at least equally indicative that there is a
critical role for trial judges to play in ensuring that any evidence 
admitted on the issue of causation of emotional distress—whether 
provided through expert testimony or otherwise—is of a kind that is in 
fact reasonable, helpful, and appropriate for fact finders to consider. 
Since awards for psychological injuries are not based upon
mathematical precision, courts have more latitude to shape the evidence 
fact finders consider to arrive at their determination of a fair and just
damages award to compensate the plaintiff. 
F. Normative Determinations of Causation and Mental Illness 
As this review has demonstrated, courts rarely consider limiting
the evidence of alternative causes of emotional distress. Rather, courts 
appear to conclude that fairness principles require admissibility of any
evidence offered to support alternative causation and the apportionment 
of psychological injuries among various causes.  Indeed, while the case 
law—through standards such as “proximate cause” and “substantial 
factor”—imposes limitations on what a plaintiff may offer in support of 
her claim of causation, there are few constraints on what a defendant 
may offer as evidence of an alleged alternative source of causation. 
However, there is no reason for courts to abandon normative 
constructions of causation simply because the opposing party advances 
a competing causation theory.  By so doing, courts undermine the goals 
served by our rules-based system of evidence and permit fact finders to
base their conclusions on evidence that falls outside of the principles
developed to allocate responsibility between litigants in cases alleging
personal injuries. 
The concept of legal or proximate cause recognizes that there are 
potentially infinite causes that bring about particular events, but that 
only certain ones (due to temporal, physical, and foreseeability
relationships to the injury at issue) are appropriate to impose liability
under our legal system.  In terms of alternative causation, the same is
necessarily true; there are infinite potential alternative factual causes of 
an injury.  If, before leaving the house, the plaintiff had not received a 
phone call that delayed her departure by 2.37 minutes, then she would
not have been in the car accident with the defendant.  “But for” the call,
the accident would not have happened; but few would argue that it is an
194 See Goodman-Delahunty & Foote, supra note 118, at 191 (“Although preexisting
psychopathology may produce work impairment and work stresses may induce psychopathology, 
the two probably interact in a complex manner.”).
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“alternative cause” that would provide a basis to apportion damages or 
permit the defendant to escape liability. As a practical matter,
defendants do not usually advance such tenuous arguments of alternate 
causation, other than perhaps in the context of psychological injuries. 
And while the causes of such injuries are widely varied and complexly
interconnected, it appears from the case law that defendants’ theories of 
alternative causation often focus on the admissibility of evidence of
purported alternative causes that also happen to cast plaintiffs in an
unfavorable light. 
The point here is not to subject psychological injuries and
preexisting mental illness to an analysis to reach a nonnormative 
determination of causation, if such result is even possible.  Rather, it is 
critical to regard these decisions about what evidence a fact finder may
consider in making determinations of legal causes and alternative 
causes, as being in themselves normative determinations.195  We should
not delude ourselves into thinking that admitting evidence of alternative
causes serves as an aid for the fact finders to find the truth; rather, such
evidence leads them to a truth. 
The decisions in Robinson and Mendez suggest that questions of 
causation of psychological injuries should rarely be resolved using
evidence of a plaintiff’s preexisting emotional difficulties.  To be sure, 
such exclusion would certainly strike many as patently unfair to civil
defendants due to the widespread practice (based, to some extent, upon
substantive law) of allowing defendants to challenge the cause of 
psychological injuries by offering evidence of alternative stressors.196 
However, close examination and re-evaluation of such practice, and the 
assumptions upon which it is based, are warranted, particularly in cases 
where such evidence is directly indicative of a past or concurrent mental
illness (as opposed to evidence describing life events, such as divorce,
financial stress, etc.).197 The varying court approaches to the
admissibility of such evidence reflect the courts’ disparate views of how 
causation should be constructed, and, by extension, how responsibility 
should be allocated. By including such mental illness in the causation
analysis and permitting diminished recoveries to result, courts place 
such mental illness on one side of the equation, to the defendant’s
195 Fumerton & Kress, supra note 36, at 86 (“[While certain] determinations of law involve
nonnormative matters of fact . . . our decision to make a given nonnormative fact relevant to a
finding of law is itself grounded in normative considerations.” (emphasis added)). 
196 Some courts, of course, exclude discovery of a plaintiff’s psychiatric injuries on privilege, 
relevancy, or privacy grounds, thus eliminating any potential controversy over the admissibility
of such evidence.  See Smith, supra note 6, at 107-28.
197 This is not to suggest that any evidence of life stressors should be admitted for this
purpose. Evidence such as that concerning extramarital affairs, abortions, and other matters may
well be unfairly prejudicial and properly subject to exclusion. 
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advantage. Moreover, psychiatry is itself value-laden.198 Thus, where 
an expert ties or bases a causation opinion and analysis on the criteria of
a DSM diagnosis, jury determinations may reflect, unwittingly, the
underlying value choices of that diagnosis. 
As discussed in the next two Parts, many courts have already 
determined that a plaintiff’s psychiatric history is generally inadmissible 
on the issues of credibility and propensity.  Given the risk that evidence 
purportedly offered solely on the issue of alternate causation could quite 
easily be used for either or both of these impermissible reasons, the 
long-standing use of such evidence bears more careful consideration,
notwithstanding its prevalence. 
II. CREDIBILITY
In addition to offering evidence of a plaintiff’s mental illness to
support a theory of alternative causation, some civil defendants attempt 
to introduce such evidence on the issue of credibility, either to suggest
that the plaintiff’s trial testimony is not to be believed or that the
plaintiff’s original perception of events was inaccurate and the product 
of such illness.199  There is no clear consensus in the courts regarding 
such use of psychiatric evidence. Several have yielded to the
temptation of allowing mental health professionals to provide fact 
finders with scientific-sounding bases to discount plaintiffs’ versions of
events, while others are more cautious about the use of such evidence. 
At common law, insanity could serve as a basis for a court’s ruling 
that a witness was incompetent and therefore barred from providing 
testimony in court.200 During the twentieth century, fact finder 
assessments of credibility replaced court determinations of competence
in nearly all instances.201  In the Federal Rules of Evidence enacted in 
1975, for example, Rule 601 establishes a presumption of
198 Daniel W. Shuman, Softened Science in the Courtroom: Forensic Implications of a Value-
Laden Classification, in  DESCRIPTIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS: VALUES, MENTAL DISORDERS,
AND THE DSMS 217, 224-25 (John Z. Sadler ed., 2002). 
199 See, e.g., Mark S. Lipian, Personality Disorders in Employment Litigation, in  MENTAL 
AND EMOTIONAL INJURIES IN EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION, supra note 22, at 212, 251 (asserting
that, in employment ligation, “personality disorders typically are relevant to the credibility of the
plaintiff’s account of the events in question”); James J. McDonald, Jr., The Legal Context, in
MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL INJURIES IN EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION, supra note 160, at 1, 22-24
(observing that courts may admit expert testimony “to show the plaintiff’s perception of 
harassment or discrimination was not accurate”); Jonathan P. Rosman, Malingering: Distortion
and Deception in Employment Litigation, in  MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL INJURIES IN
EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION, supra note 22, at 409, 417-20 (“There are certain psychiatric factors
that predispose some plaintiffs to think unreasonably and be hypersensitive to others.”).
200 Michael D. Ermert, Mental Disorder in Witnesses: An Overview of Competency and
Credibility Issues, 41 ALA. L. REV. 167, 167 (1989). 
201 See id. at 170. 
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competency.202  One commentator noted that the language of that rule
“converts all other issues that the common law regarded as going to 
competency into questions of witness credibility to be decided by the 
jury.”203  Given the fact finder’s role in assessing credibility, parties 
present evidence regarding a trial witness’s credibility at trial along with
evidence on liability and damages, rather than as part of a preliminary
proceeding before the court. 
Evidence law constructs credibility broadly.204  Dean Wigmore
observed that “[a]ny trait importing in itself a defective power of 
observation (at the time of the matter testified to), or of recollection, or 
of communication, is admissible, provided the power is substantially
defective as judged by the average standard of mentality.”205  Thus,
proof of alleged mental incapacity with respect to credibility is “always 
relevant . . . [and] never collateral.”206 
There is no single evidence rule addressing the admissibility of 
evidence on the issue of a witness’s credibility.207  However, a number 
of rules do touch on credibility, particularly those that limit the
admissibility of evidence of a witness’s character for untruthfulness.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a party may offer evidence of a 
witness’s character for untruthfulness through opinion or reputation
testimony or, in the court’s discretion, on cross-examination.208 
Arguably, an expert witness could offer an opinion on an individual’s 
character for untruthfulness,209 but it is unclear what kind of background
202  FED. R. EVID. 601 (“Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise 
provided in these rules.”).  The rule also provides that in diversity cases, witness competency is a
matter of state law. Id.  Some states still have competency rules excluding people with mental 
illness from testifying entirely.  ROGER C. PARK, TRIAL OBJECTIONS HANDBOOK § 7:23 (2d ed. 
2007). 
203 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 124, § 6097. 
204 3A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 931 (Chadbourn 
rev. 1970) (emphasis omitted).
205 Id.
206  MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 162, § 6:80 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).  Similarly, evidence—including extrinsic evidence—of a witness’s bias or impaired
perception is generally considered to be highly relevant and is generally admissible.  See id.; see 
also United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50-52 (1984) (noting that, notwithstanding the absence
of reference to “bias” in the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence of bias is relevant and therefore
admissible for impeachment purposes). 
207 Anne Bowen Poulin, Credibility: A Fair Subject for Expert Testimony?, 59 FLA. L. REV. 
991, 997 (2007); see also Daniel David Blinka, Why Modern Evidence Law Lacks Credibility 6 
(Marquette Univ. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 09-12, 
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1372763 (“[E]vidence law is bereft of any systematic
approach to determining credibility.”).
208  FED. R. EVID. 608.  For example, a plaintiff may be asked about prior instances in which 
she offered untruthful statements as evidence of a character for untruthfulness.  Extrinsic
evidence (that is, evidence offered other than through the witness whose credibility is being 
impeached) of specific instances of untruthfulness is not admissible, with the exception of 
evidence of a witness’s prior criminal convictions.  FED. R. EVID. 608(b), 609. 
209  FED. R. EVID. 608(b).  Professor Poulin makes such argument, see Poulin, supra note 207,
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makes one an “expert” on a person’s character for untruthfulness, as 
that is an exceedingly subjective and value-based concept.210  However,
the line between offering impeachment evidence of a witness’s capacity
to offer reliable testimony and attacking her general character for
untruthfulness is not a bright one.211 
The contemporary case law on the admissibility of evidence of a
witness’s mental illness for purposes of impeaching her credibility has 
developed nearly entirely in the criminal realm, where criminal
defendants seek to offer evidence of prosecution witnesses’ mental 
illnesses to generate reasonable doubt.  In those cases, however, the 
courts admitting such evidence often base their rulings in significant
part on Due Process and Sixth Amendment considerations, and few 
make reference to any specific rules of evidence other than perhaps 
Rules 401 and 403.212  The most famous opinion on this issue (and one
that is still cited) arose in the notorious 1950 perjury trial of Alger Hiss, 
in which Hiss sought to offer evidence that the prosecutor’s primary
witness, Whittaker Chambers, was mentally ill.213  The trial court
commented that it was the first federal court to consider the question
since “use of psychiatric testimony to impeach the credibility of a
witness is a comparatively modern innovation.”214  The court considered
the state courts’ approach and concluded: “The existence of insanity or 
mental derangement is admissible for the purpose of discrediting a 
witness. Evidence of insanity is not merely for the judge on the 
preliminary question of competency, but goes to the jury to affect 
credibility.”215  The psychiatrist listened to Chambers’ trial testimony 
and later offered his opinion, based upon his observations at trial, that 
Chambers had a “psychopathic personality.”216 
at 1008-21, although she notes a distinction between expert testimony on “truthfulness” and that
regarding “credibility,” which would more accurately capture the gist of testimony regarding
psychological conditions.  Id. at 1017.
210 Indeed, one psychiatrist opined: “Honesty is a value judgment and not psychiatrically
relevant or determinable.”  Marcus, supra note 86, at 430. 
211 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 124, § 6097 (noting that evidence of mental illness may 
be offered for the purpose of raising questions not only about a witness’s “capacity” but also the 
“witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness”). 
212 See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez, 256 F.3d 330, 343 (5th Cir. 2001)  (“[A] defendant has
the right to attempt to challenge [a witness’s] credibility with competent or relevant evidence of 
any mental defect or treatment at a time probatively related to the time period about which he was
attempting to testify.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 
1140 (2002); State v. Fichera, 903 A.2d 1030, 1039 (N.H. 2006) (stating that the right to cross-
examine adverse witnesses is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment) (citing Douglas v. Alabama, 
380 U.S. 415 (1965)). 
213 United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).  See generally ALLEN WEINSTEIN,
PERJURY: THE HISS-CHAMBERS CASE (1997). 
214 Hiss, 88 F. Supp. at 559.  Indeed, the court noted that the “value of psychiatry” to court 
proceedings came to be recognized only during the decades just prior to the decision. Id. at 560. 
215 Id. at 559. 
216 Edwin C. Conrad, Psychiatric Lie Detection, 21 F.R.D. 199, 205 (1957).  Notwithstanding 
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In the years following Hiss, legal commentators’ interest in the use
of psychiatric evidence to impeach a witness’s trial testimony widened. 
A series of articles written in the mid-twentieth century suggested that 
the fields of psychiatry and psychology could yield great benefits to the 
process of assessing witness credibility, particularly with respect to
“pathological liars” or others with alleged personality disorders.217  The
arguments in some of those articles proved persuasive to the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in its influential 1983 opinion in
United States v. Lindstrom.218  The panel there observed: 
Mental illness may tend to produce bias in a witness’[s] testimony. 
A psychotic’s veracity may be impaired by lack of capacity to 
observe, correlate or recollect actual events.  A paranoid person may 
interpret a reality skewed by suspicions, antipathies or fantasies. A 
schizophrenic may have difficulty distinguishing fact from fantasy 
and may have his memory distorted by delusions, hallucinations and
paranoid thinking.  A paranoid schizophrenic, though he may appear 
normal and his judgment on matters outside his delusional system
may remain intact, may harbor delusions of grandeur or persecution
that grossly distort his reactions to events.219 
Under the case law that developed as a result of these leading
cases, a party may offer proof of a witness’s mental illness through 
cross-examination of the witness, such as by asking the witness about 
prior psychiatric hospitalizations or other treatment or about the
witness’s symptoms.220  Alternatively, some courts permit the defendant
to offer evidence of the witness’s mental illness through expert forensic 
psychiatric or psychological testimony, as in Hiss.221  However, even in
that testimony, the jury convicted Hiss. Id.
217 David B. Saxe, Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis, and the Credibility of Witnesses, 45 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 238 (1970); see also Conrad, supra note 216, at 215 (“We can say that the science 
of psychiatry has advanced to such a stage of development that the use of expert psychiatric 
testimony on the issue of credibility is a sound principle of judicial proof.”); Michael Juviler,
Psychiatric Opinions as to Credibility of Witnesses: A Suggested Approach, 48 CAL. L. REV. 648, 
651 (1960) (“The law needs a means by which psychiatry can make the jury aware of a witness’s 
mental or emotional condition and, more important, of its effect upon his testimony.”);
Psychiatric Evaluation of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59 YALE L.J. 1324 (1950) (arguing for 
broad use of expert psychiatric testimony on the issue of a witness’s credibility); Henry
Weihofen, Testimonial Competence and Credibility, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 53, 90 (1965) 
(discussing expanded use of psychiatric examination and testimony on the issue of witness
credibility).
218 United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154 (11th Cir. 1983).  The panel cited specifically to
the Weihofen and Juviler articles, supra note 217, in its analysis.  Id. at 1160-61. 
219 Id. at 1160. 
220  MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 162, § 6:80; see also Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d
870, 877 (8th Cir. 2004) (affirming admission of plaintiff’s response to question on cross
examination: “And you admit that there were times in the past that you’ve heard voices?”), cert. 
denied, 546 U.S. 860 (2005). 
221 Ermert, supra note 200, at 174-79.  Courts generally do not permit the admissibility of
expert evidence to bolster a civil plaintiff’s credibility, such as to explain an apparent discrepancy 
in statements. See, e.g., Westcott v. Crinklaw, 68 F.3d 1073, 1075-77 (8th Cir. 1995) (reversing
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the criminal realm, use of such evidence is not unlimited or
uncontroversial.222  Courts are more willing to admit testimony of
psychiatric illness for purposes of impeachment where the illness is
schizophrenia or some other form of psychosis, as opposed to
depression or other mood disorders,223 and many courts remain wary
that the admissibility of expert testimony on the issue of credibility will 
unduly invade the province of the jury.224 
Far fewer courts have addressed the issue of the admissibility of
psychiatric evidence for credibility purposes in the civil context, and 
defendants seeking to introduce such evidence have had mixed results. 
As with the cases decided in the criminal context, however, courts 
usually base their decisions on general notions of relevance, rather than 
upon specific evidence rules, such as those regarding evidence of a 
witness’s character for truthfulness. For example, the court in
Ramseyer v. General Motors Corp. noted agreement among the 
courts—especially federal courts—that a “witness’[s] previous mental 
incapacity serves as a proper subject for cross-examination to determine
credibility.”225 
Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
Revels v. Vincenz affirmed a trial court’s entry of judgment on a 
psychiatric patient’s § 1983 claim after a trial in which the court 
admitted evidence on cross-examination of plaintiff that he had “heard 
voices” in the past.226  The appeals court accepted as well-settled that a 
party may make “use of a witness’s mental condition to challenge his 
credibility.”227 The court also rejected the plaintiff’s Rule 403 
argument.  Because the case concerned sharply divergent versions of
certain incidents, for which the parties were the sole witnesses, the court
reasoned that “the credibility of each party and his ability to discern and
tell the truth carried great probative value not substantially outweighed 
by the risk of unfair prejudice.”228  Notably, however, the court required
no evidence (and the plaintiff did not apparently argue this point) that 
“hearing voices” was in fact probative of the plaintiff’s “ability to 
discern and tell the truth.”229  Nor did the court require any showing of
trial court’s ruling admitting expert’s testimony that plaintiff suffered from PTSD, which could
have caused him to make “inaccurate, unreliable and incomplete statements” as impermissible
bolstering of the plaintiff’s credibility which invaded the jury’s function).
222 See Poulin, supra note 207, at 1013-14. 
223 State v. Fichera, 903 A.2d 1030, 1040 (N.H. 2006); United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 82-
83 (1st Cir.1992). 
224 See Poulin, supra note 207, at 1001-04; see also United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 
912-13 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974). 
225 Ramseyer v. Gen. Motors Corp., 417 F.2d 859, 863 (8th Cir. 1969). 
226 Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 877 (8th Cir. 2004). 
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id.
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how recently the plaintiff had heard voices so that such evidence would 
be in fact probative of his truthfulness at the time of trial. Rather, the 
court assumed that the fact finder could draw appropriate inferences 
about the plaintiff’s credibility from the plaintiff’s affirmative answer to 
the question.
Several courts have admitted expert psychiatric testimony on the
issue of a civil plaintiff’s testimony. The court in Lanni v. New Jersey
ruled that the proffered testimony of defendant’s forensic psychiatrist
regarding the plaintiff’s factitious and narcissistic personality disorders 
was relevant to “causation” in an employment discrimination case
because it suggested a reason why the plaintiff felt he had been
subjected to discrimination.230  As noted supra in Part I, courts
generally impose few limitations on defendants’ use of a plaintiff’s 
psychiatric history to argue a theory of alternative causation.  But the 
court’s reasoning in this case appears to include a misapplication of the 
concept of “causation” in the usual sense of the word in the litigation
context. If the court means that the psychiatrist’s diagnoses offer an 
explanation of what caused the plaintiff to make allegations of disability 
discrimination, then it is not an issue of legal “causation” but 
“credibility,” in the same sense that bias, for example, can “cause” one 
to testify to something that did not happen. 
In Frazier v. Topeka Metal Specialties, Inc., a case in which the
court entered partial summary judgment for the defendant, leaving some 
issues for trial, the court noted that there was evidence in the record that 
the plaintiff had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and an 
antisocial personality disorder.231  The defendant’s psychiatric expert
had opined that the plaintiff’s “problems at work were derived from his
inability to perceive or process what was going on around him” and
commented that “you cannot joke with schizophrenics,” suggesting that 
what the plaintiff may have perceived to be racial harassment was 
actually “horsing around.”232  The court noted that the question of 
whether the plaintiff was in fact subjected to harassment or whether his 
perception of the same was the product of his mental illness was a 
“credibility issue to be determined by the jury,” signaling that it would
admit the psychiatric evidence for this purpose at trial.233 
There can be little doubt that evidence of a party’s mental illness 
can have a significant impact on fact finders’ assessments of credibility. 
The analyses in bench trial opinions where evidence of a plaintiff’s 
mental illness—particularly when presented through testimony of a 
230 Lanni v. New Jersey, 177 F.R.D. 295, 302-03 (D.N.J. 1998). 

231 Frazier v. Topeka Metal Specialties, Inc., No. 99-4029-DES, 2001 WL 138893 (D. Kan.
 
Feb. 15, 2001). 
232 Id. at *2. 
233 Id. at *10. 
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defendant’s forensic expert—leads the court to conclude that the 
plaintiff’s account is not to be believed demonstrate the effectiveness of 
this evidence. These cases in which psychiatric evidence was offered 
ostensibly on the issue of credibility are also noteworthy because we 
can see the role such evidence can play in a fact finder’s decision-
making, not only strictly with respect to the credibility of the plaintiff’s 
trial testimony, but also as evidence of the plaintiff’s overall
character.234 
The decision in Sudtelgte v. Reno provides a clear example of how 
a lay fact finder may use psychiatric evidence to determine credibility, 
and therefore liability, issues.235  The trial court entered judgment for 
the defendant in this sexual harassment case after hearing testimony that
the plaintiff had received psychiatric treatment since the age of sixteen, 
and had been diagnosed with atypical bipolar disorder, psychosis, 
narcissistic personality disorder, and paranoid personality disorder.236 
Her employer’s psychiatrist concluded, after examination, that the 
increase in the plaintiff’s symptoms was due to an exacerbation of “a
life-long vulnerability to either manic or hypomanic episodes or major
depressive episodes due to an inherited vulnerability” by recent job-
related stress.237  The trial judge quoted extensively from the DSM-III-
R’s238 diagnostic criteria for paranoid personality disorder, which one
examining psychiatrist opined had preexisted the plaintiff’s employment
by the defendant, noting with emphasis that the condition is commonly
associated with “occupational difficulties . . . especially in relating to
authority figures or co-workers.”239 The court also quoted another 
examiner who had opined that the plaintiff “externalizes blames for her
shortcomings.  She uses repression and conversion to cope with her 
anxiety and confusion. . . .  She has difficulty with a female sexual role.
She is narcissistic and hypersensitive. Individuals with similar profile 
worry constantly and are easily upset and hurt.”240  The court
concluded in its findings that the evidence was undisputed that the 
234 See, e.g., George v. Frank, 761 F. Supp. 256, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Spencer v. Gen. Elec. 
Co., 697 F. Supp. 204, 211 (E.D. Va. 1988) (noting that expert testimony about plaintiff’s
“histrionic personality disorder” “r[a]ng true” when rejecting her testimony about an alleged
sexual assault); Davis v. U.S. Steel Corp., 539 F. Supp. 839, 840 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (“Plaintiff is an
emotionally disturbed man who perceived discipline as harassment . . . .”). 
235 Sudtelgte v. Reno, No. 90-1016-CV-W-6, 1994 WL 3406 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 3, 1994). 

236 Id. at *11-12. 

237 Id. at *11. 

238  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 

DISORDERS (3d ed. rev. 1987) (DSM-III-R).
239 Sudtelgte, 1994 WL 3406 at *12 (quoting DSM-III-R). This opinion exemplifies many of 
the dangers noted by Professor Daniel Shuman who observed that, while the DSM was “not 
intended to be a forensic cookbook or lay medical guide . . . its diagnostic criteria are enticing to
judges and lawyers as a lay guidebook to psychiatry for the unschooled and untrained.”  Shuman, 
supra note 30, at 854. 

240 Sudtelgte, 1994 WL 3406, at *13. 
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plaintiff was “both paranoid and narcissistic (self-centered)” and that
her testimony regarding harassment in connection with her employment 
was unreliable and not credible.241 
Pascouau v. Martin Marietta Corp. provides a similarly stark
example of how such evidence can influence fact-finding in precisely
the manner that the character evidence rules were intended to prevent,
as discussed further in the next Part.242  The court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law after a bench trial in that sexual harassment case 
included an entire section with the heading “Plaintiff’s Psychological
Profile.”243  The defendant’s expert, whom the court found to be more
persuasive, diagnosed the plaintiff with “mixed personality disorder
with borderline histrionic and narcissistic characteristics.”244  The court
found, based upon this testimony: “The disorder leads to the 
formulation of implausible perceptions and thus different kinds of 
conclusions about what other people’s actions and behavior mean as
distinguished from what a reasonable person not subject to such a 
disorder would perceive them to mean.”245  The court’s findings then
detailed the general characteristics of these two personality disorders 
such as: “makes judgments that are highly personalized and overly 
emotional,” “sees things in black and white terms rather than shades of 
gray,” “feels whatever goes wrong is someone else’s fault,” “take[s] no 
personal responsibility for what goes wrong in their lives,” and “over-
evaluates and over-values other people, and then, when the slightest 
thing goes wrong, demeans those people and becomes angry and upset 
with them.”246  Finally, the court referenced psychiatric testimony in
concluding that “the [plaintiff’s] disorders are causes of the allegations.
The incidents Plaintiff related were characterized by misinterpretations 
of events and interactions with fellow employees that were far more
intense than would be interpreted by a reasonable person.”247  It is not
surprising, therefore, that the court found the plaintiff to be not credible 
and entered judgment for the defendant.248 
While evidence rules allow admission of evidence on the issue of 
credibility, including certain kinds of opinion evidence of a witness’s 
character for truthfulness, the expert psychiatric evidence offered in 
each of these cases unquestionably extended beyond the issue of the
241 Id. at *4 n.3.
 
242 Pascouau v. Martin Marietta Corp., 994 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Colo. 1998). 

243 Id. at 1278-80. 

244 Id. at 1278. 

245 Id. at 1279. 

246 Id.
 
247 Id. The court rejected the plaintiff’s forensic psychiatric expert because he had attributed 

all of her “emotional difficulties” to problems in her workplace and did not consider her “profuse
psychiatric history.” Id.
248 Id. at 1282-83. 
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plaintiffs’ capacity to provide reliable trial testimony and into the realm 
of character evidence, by suggesting that the plaintiffs’ allegations 
stemmed largely from their predisposition to narcissism, paranoia, poor
judgment, and inadequate social skills.  The arguably probative value of 
such evidence for purposes of assessing the veracity of the plaintiff’s 
trial testimony does not eliminate the possibility that such psychiatric 
evidence may also amount to impermissible character evidence, as 
discussed further in the next Part.249 
Indeed, a recent series of cases reveals that some courts are wary of
the use of psychiatric evidence, particularly by juries, for purposes of 
assessing witness credibility in civil cases for precisely this reason.  The 
defendant in O’Brien v. Chaparro sought to introduce evidence that one
of the plaintiff’s witnesses had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder.250 
In response to plaintiff’s arguments that such condition did not affect 
the witness’s memory, the defense offered literature from the National
Institute for Mental Health indicating that bipolar disorder could feature
“symptoms of psychosis.”251 The court noted, however, that the
literature said nothing about “distortions of memory,” and that even 
occasional episodes of psychosis are not associated with memory
loss.252  Accordingly, the witness’s diagnosis was simply irrelevant.
The court also questioned the continued validity of Lindstrom, 
particularly because it relied upon scholarly articles written in the 
1960s. The court further noted that “the remaining stigma in our society 
of mental illness makes admission of such evidence in this case to be 
substantially more prejudicial than probative,” and therefore the 
evidence would in any event be inadmissible pursuant to Rule 403.253 
Other federal courts similarly demonstrate reluctance to admit such 
testimony in the civil context, particularly where the primary evidence
of such mental illness came through an expert forensic psychiatrist 
retained by the defendant rather than from current clinical treatment
records of the plaintiff.  For example, in Bonner v. Falcon Drilling Co., 
the defendant in a personal injury case sought to introduce expert
psychiatric testimony that the plaintiff had an anti-social personality 
249 See infra notes 272-319 and accompanying text; cf. Kelly v. Ward, No. C-3-93-110, 1994 
WL 1631041, at *3-4 (S.D. Ohio July 6, 1994) (accepting plaintiff’s argument that evidence of
defendant’s psychiatric history could be admissible on issue of “bias” and therefore credibility,
even if it would not be admissible as character evidence). 
250 O’Brien v. Chaparro, No. 05-80342-CIV, 2005 WL 6011248, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 
2005). 
251 Id. at *3. 
252 Id.; see also State v. Fichera, 903 A.2d 1030, 1039 (N.H. 2006) (“The trial court may 
prohibit cross-examination [of a witness about her psychiatric history] if the defendant is unable 
to show that the mental impairment affects the witness’s perception of events to which she is
testifying.”).
253 O’Brien, 2005 WL 6011248, at *3
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disorder.254 The defendant argued unsuccessfully that such evidence
was probative of the plaintiff’s credibility.255  The court noted that
“deceitfulness” was one of the “diagnostic criteria” for the personality
disorder and excluded the testimony as inadmissible character 
evidence.256 
The court in Hodges v. Keane excluded the defendant’s expert who
examined the prisoner-plaintiff in a case alleging a “systematic pattern
of harassment, intimidation and retaliation” against him by prison 
officials and concluded that he had an anti-social personality disorder 
and a history of schizophrenia.257  Although the court acknowledged
that evidence of mental illness could be relevant to the issue of 
credibility, the psychiatric records were dated thirteen years prior to the 
trial and thus had minimal probative value to render them relevant to the 
plaintiff’s credibility.258 Moreover, because the records were replete 
with “negative characterizations” of the plaintiff, the court excluded 
them under Rule 403 as well.259  Finally, because the expert’s opinion 
was itself based in large part upon a review of these negative 
characterizations, it was similarly inadmissible.260 
At least one court has expressly excluded expert psychological 
evidence offered to show a civil plaintiff’s character for untruthfulness 
pursuant to Rule 608.  In Bastow v. General Motors Corp., the
defendant in a products liability action sought to introduce evidence that 
the plaintiff “had an antisocial behavior disorder and hence a character
for untruthfulness.”261  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence, but primarily out of 
concern that the effect of receiving psychologists’ and psychiatrists’
expert opinions on credibility “may cause juries to surrender their own 
common sense in weighing testimony [and] it may produce a trial 
within a trial of what is a collateral but important matter.”262 
254 Bonner v. Falcon Drilling Co., No. 95-4077, 1997 WL 162042 (E.D. La. Apr. 4, 1997). 
The opinion itself does not describe the type of case but the federal court docket described it as
“marine personal injury.” 
255 Id. at *1. 
256 Id.  The court also dismissed the proffered testimony that the plaintiff was diagnosed with 
“malingering,” which not only constituted inadmissible character evidence, but also raised 
potential concerns of unfair prejudice under Rule 403. Id.
257 Hodges v Keane, 886 F. Supp. 352, 356-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 

258 Id. at 356. 

259 Id. at 357. 

260 Id.; see also PARK, supra note 202, § 7:23 (“Expert testimony that the witness has an
 
emotional condition that makes the witness a liar is often objectionable.  Such evidence may 
be . . . unhelpful to the jury in its special province of determining truthfulness; its scientific basis
is often questionable; and it can amount to making a character attack under the guise of medical 
testimony.”). 
261 Bastow v. Gen. Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 506, 510 (8th Cir. 1988). 
262 Id. at 511 (quoting United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912-13 (9th Cir. 1973)); see 
also Poulin, supra note 207, at 1001-08 (criticizing courts’ frequent invocation of the common 
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There are particular dangers of unfair prejudice when the witness 
whose testimony is being impeached is also a party.  In such cases, the 
jury must make determinations not only about the individual’s trial 
testimony but also about her conduct with respect to the events at issue 
in the litigation and, in the case of the plaintiff, whether to award 
monetary damages or other relief.263  One pair of commentators has 
suggested that, because “[t]he potential for evidence of mental illness to 
inflict unfair prejudice is so great, a party may be precluded from asking 
a witness questions on the subject unless there is a good faith belief that 
this line of questioning might lead to evidence pertinent to credibility”;
they urge particular caution where evidence of mental illness is offered 
through expert testimony.264 
Where defendants offer the evidence of psychiatric disorders for 
the express purpose of impeachment, courts increasingly and correctly
recognize the danger of such evidence.265  However, we can also see
from the bench trial opinions the great weight that laypeople give to
mental health information in their credibility determinations, even in the
absence of expert testimony explaining what specific link, if any, exists 
between a mental disorder and accurate perception, memory, and
narrative.266  Laypeople likely draw inferences about a witness’s 
credibility when presented with evidence of the person’s psychiatric
diagnosis, regardless of whether an expert’s opinion or an attorney’s
closing argument spells out a specific connection between such 
evidence and the issue of credibility.  This suggests that fact finders use 
psychiatric evidence for the purpose of assessing credibility even when 
such use was not the defendant’s stated theory of relevancy at the time it 
offered the evidence, such as when the defendant asserts that the 
evidence is probative of alternative causes of the plaintiff’s 
psychological injuries. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Nichols v.
American National Insurance Co. vacated the judgment for the 
defendant in a sexual harassment case based on precisely this concern
about misuse of psychiatric evidence.267  The trial court had admitted 
the testimony of a defendant’s expert forensic psychiatrist—purportedly
law maxim “that an expert witness must not invade the jury’s province of determining witness 
credibility”).
263 See 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 124, § 6097 (citing FED. R. EVID. 404, 405). 
264 Id.
265 See, e.g., Kelly v. Ward, No. C-3-93-110, 1994 WL 1631041, at *5 (S.D. Ohio July 6, 
1994) (noting the danger that psychiatric evidence offered to impeach a litigant’s testimony may
be misused as character evidence by the jury). 
266 For example, a person diagnosed with schizophrenia has not necessarily experienced 
delusions and hallucinations, or such symptoms may be well-controlled with medication. See
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 64, at 312-13 (setting forth diagnostic criteria for 
schizophrenia). 

267 Nichols v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 154 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. 1998). 
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on the issue of alternative causation of damages—that the plaintiff had a 
personality disorder and an “undifferentiated somatoform disorder.”268 
The psychiatrist opined that the plaintiff “lacked psychiatric 
credibility.”  The appeals court ruled that such evidence was not the 
proper subject of expert testimony under Daubert and instead addressed
“the very question at the heart of the jury’s task—could Nichols be 
believed?”269 The court expressed concern that such evidence could 
have confused or misled the jury, particularly because the psychiatrist’s
testimony was not limited to the damages issues in the case but
suggested that the plaintiff was not accurate in her descriptions of the 
central events in dispute.270 
The key problem with the expert’s testimony in Nichols was that 
the psychiatrist had “used a psychological label to offer her evaluation 
of the truth of Nichols’s statements, the accuracy of which is a pure 
question of credibility.”271 While the defense expert’s use of the word
“credibility” in her testimony is likely what alerted the appeals court to 
the jurors’ potential misuse of the evidence, other elements of her 
testimony presented the same risk.  Trial courts, therefore, must limit
fact finders’ exposure to psychiatric evidence, which they could easily 
use to reach broad conclusions about the plaintiff’s credibility. 
III. CHARACTER
Civil litigation defendants may also use evidence of a plaintiff’s
mental illness to suggest that such mental illness indicates that the 
plaintiff herself instigated or contributed to the incident at issue in the
litigation.272  Such use is more implicit than explicit since evidence rules 
generally exclude such use of “character evidence” in civil litigation. 
Where admitted, however, psychiatric evidence presents a particularly
powerful form of character evidence since it also taps directly into the 
stigma associated with mental illness. 
The basic prohibition on character evidence in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, set forth in Rule 404(a), provides that: “Evidence of a 
person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for the 
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion.”273 The character evidence prohibition is aimed at the use of 
evidence about a person, distinct from the incident in question, to
268 Id. at 882. 

269 Id. at 883. 

270 Id. at 883-84. 

271 Id. at 884 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
 
272 See McDonald, supra note 22, 34-35. 

273  FED. R. EVID. 404(a). 
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suggest that the incident is more likely (or not) to have happened.
Character evidence thus attempts to establish “a causal connection
between personality and action.”274 
Character evidence is highly persuasive because all humans make
assumptions about other individuals’ likely conduct based upon their 
past behavior or particular attributes.275  We assume that one’s 
“character”—which is not defined in the evidence rules but is generally 
considered to refer to one’s fixed traits—is predictive of one’s conduct 
on a particular occasion, such as an event at issue in litigation.276 
However, such an assumption about human behavior came under sharp
attack from psychologists who challenged the “trait theory” that had
developed in the early twentieth century.277  Legal scholars cited to 
“situationist” psychological theories in support of arguments to limit the 
admissibility of character evidence.278  As a result, contemporary 
evidence rules reflect concerns that fact finders will assign inappropriate 
weight to evidence—making a “fundamental attribution error”—that 
may not be highly predictive of behavior.279  Alternatively, there is 
concern that jurors will use character evidence to conclude that a litigant
is a “bad person” or otherwise unworthy and therefore rule against him 
on that basis in part or in whole.280 
Because evidence of a person’s fixed traits can be powerful,
evidence rules purport to limit fact finders’ access to it except under 
certain narrow circumstances, particularly in the civil context.  Indeed, 
the only generally recognized exception to the admissibility of character
evidence in civil litigation is reputation or, in the case of federal courts, 
opinion evidence on a trial witness’s character for “truthfulness,” as 
discussed supra in Part II.281  However, courts admit such evidence, not
274  STEIN, supra note 112, at 227. 
275 State v. Martinez, 195 P.3d 1232, 1236 (N.M. 2008) (“Modern scientific research now 
confirms what human beings have always observed in their own family and community
relationships, that the average person is able to explain, and even predict, a subject’s behavior 
with a significant degree of accuracy.”). 
276 David P. Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in
the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 25 (1986); cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone:
Individualizing Justice Through Psychological Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1 (1993)
(arguing in favor of admissibility of expert “psychological character evidence” on behalf of
criminal defendants).
277 Leonard, supra note 276, at 28-29; Edward J. Imwinkelried, Reshaping the “Grotesque” 
Doctrine of Character Evidence: The Reform Implications of the Most Recent Psychological 
Research, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 741, 748-50 (2008). 
278 Imwinkelried, supra note 277, at 750-51.  Professor Imwinkelried argues that more
contemporary psychologists’ research has rejected the situationist approach as too extreme in
favor of “Interactionism.” Id. at 752-54; see also Martinez, 195 P.2d at 1236 (observing that 
research has suggested that “[h]uman beings do behave more or less consistently across a
multitude of similar situations” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
279 Imwinkelried, supra note 277, at 742; Leonard, supra note 276, at 18. 
280 Imwinkelried, supra note 277, at 741-42. 
281 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 608(a).  The Federal Rules of Evidence also allow for the
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as substantive evidence of “relevant conduct,” but rather for purposes of 
impeachment only.282 
Notwithstanding this broad prohibition, evidence rules allow the 
admission of evidence for an alternative, permissible purpose, even if
the evidence is also strongly suggestive of “character.”  In other words, 
the rules do not prohibit a particular type of evidence, but rather a 
particular use of evidence. A recurring criticism of the character 
evidence rule as implemented is that courts often take a liberal view of
admitting evidence under alternative bases.  Where this occurs, courts 
assume they can avoid any unfair prejudice by offering a limiting
instruction to the jury and ensuring that the party offering the evidence
does not ask the fact finder to make an impermissible propensity
inference based upon such evidence. As one commentator noted: 
“Often the real difficulty is that the distinction between the permissible
purpose and the forbidden character inference is strained or 
nonexistent. . . .  Civil litigation yields many . . . examples of abuse and 
mischief.”283 
For example, defendants can use Rule 703 to circumvent character 
evidence rules where an expert bases an opinion on evidence that might
be otherwise inadmissible but is nonetheless of the kind “reasonably
relied” upon by experts in her field.284  The 2000 amendments have
made it more difficult for proponents to use the rule as a vehicle to get 
inadmissible evidence before the jury, albeit for a “limited purpose,” but 
they fall far short of establishing an outright prohibition.285  Indeed, at 
least one commentator has suggested that the expectation that the
evidence would be admitted only for a limited purpose and the 
opponent’s right to a limiting instruction combine to “defuse[] the 
presumption against disclosure,” and therefore the “burden is effectively
shifted to opposing counsel to explain why she is not adequately
protected by a limiting instruction.”286 
admissibility of certain evidence concerning prior sexual behavior, sexual assaults, and child 
molestation. See FED. R. EVID. 412-415. 
282 See Martinez, 195 P.2d at 1235-36 (explaining distinction between character evidence 
offered as substantive evidence and that offered for impeachment purposes). 
283 Daniel D. Blinka, Ethical Firewalls, Limited Admissibility, and Rule 703, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1229, 1241 (2007) (describing categories of evidence that would be inadmissible under a
character evidence theory of relevancy but that are admitted when offered for other purposes). 
Some commentators have suggested that the admissibility of character evidence is the “most 
litigated” evidence issue. Id.
284 Blinka, supra note 283, at 1254.  Rule 703 provides, in pertinent part: “Facts or data that 
are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or 
inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the
expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.”  FED. R. EVID. 703. 
285 Blinka, supra note 283, at 1256 (“Protestations to the contrary, amended Rule 703 
performed like the legendary alchemist’s stone, transforming inadmissible evidence into a species
of admissible evidence.”). 
286 Id. at 1260. 
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The prohibition on the use of character evidence requires the court 
to consider whether a defendant is offering evidence of a plaintiff’s 
psychiatric history to prove “action in conformity therewith” on a given
occasion, such as the incident at issue in the litigation. Thus, for 
example, if a personality disorder is associated with manipulative or 
paranoid behavior, a defendant may hope to use evidence that the 
plaintiff had such a disorder at the time of the incident in question to 
suggest that the person was engaging in manipulative and paranoid 
behavior on that particular occasion.  If a court is to admit evidence of 
the disorder, however, it must be for some ostensibly permissible 
purpose, rather than for this overt purpose of suggesting that a fact 
finder infer a particular propensity. 
Courts have not taken consistent approaches to the questions
presented by the intersection of character evidence and psychiatric
evidence. For example, in Bemben v. Hunt, the district court denied a
plaintiff’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of her psychiatric
history in an excessive force case.287  The defendant sought to introduce
evidence that the plaintiff had been diagnosed with “organic delusional 
disorder with symptoms of paranoid ideations and irrational behavior”
three years prior to the incident in question and had been treated for 
depression both before and after the incident.288  The defendant also 
offered psychiatric records that referred to the plaintiff’s “paranoia,
hostility and combativeness,” as well as evidence of “[a]ny other 
incident of depression or irrational behavior on the part of Plaintiff.”289 
The trial court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that such evidence
constituted inadmissible character evidence. Taking a categorical 
approach, the court reasoned that “[i]nsanity, or other medically
diagnosed ailments are not generally thought of as character traits.”290 
Further, such evidence was probative of the plaintiff’s “state of 
mind . . . before, during and after” the arrest at the center of the 
incident.291 
The court’s reasoning is flawed for several reasons.  Foremost, the 
court failed to note that evidence is classified (or not) as “character” 
evidence because of its purported use, not the nature or qualities of the 
evidence itself, such as whether or not the evidence consists of medical 
diagnoses. In Bemben, the defendant unquestionably offered the 
287 Bemben v. Hunt, No. 93-C-509, 1995 WL 27223 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 1995). 

288 Id. at *1. 

289 Id.
 
290 Id at *2; cf. State v. Oden, No. 48066-9-I, 2002 WL 31082064, at *3-4 (Wash. Ct. App. 

Sep. 16, 2002) (affirming criminal conviction in which the State called defendant’s forensic
psychiatrist as a rebuttal witness to testify about the defendant’s paranoia prior to the alleged 
assault and concluding that such evidence was not character evidence, which is more a matter of
“behavioral characteristics”). 
291 Bemben, 1995 WL 27223, at *2. 
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evidence of the plaintiff’s diagnoses to suggest that the plaintiff was
paranoid, hostile, and combative the night of the incident because of an 
underlying predisposition to such conduct.  The court also incorrectly
assumed that an excessive force plaintiff’s state of mind is relevant to a 
determination of liability; rather, it is the defendant’s state of mind that
is probative of the reasonableness of his conduct towards the plaintiff.292 
Even assuming that plaintiff’s state of mind was somehow relevant, it is 
hard to understand how a diagnosis three years earlier would be 
probative of her state of mind on the evening of her arrest.293 
Similarly, in Lowe v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., a race
discrimination in employment case, the plaintiff failed to convince the 
court to exclude two psychiatrists retained by the defense who offered
to testify that the plaintiff had one or more personality disorders.294  One
of the psychiatrists was expected to testify that the “plaintiff suffers 
from a personality disorder known as the ‘passive-aggressive 
personality’ which tends to manifest itself in procrastination and
intentional inefficiency making her procrastinate, dawdle and difficult 
to work with in that she is less likely to work at one hundred
percent.”295 Obviously, the impact of such testimony on the central 
issues in an employment discrimination case such as Lowe would be
quite significant.296  The court, however, ruled that such testimony 
would be relevant to the plaintiff’s “mental state,” and specifically
“whether plaintiff’s perception of racial harassment is correct,” and,
292 See, e.g., Kee v. Ahlm, 219 Fed. Appx. 727, 732 (10th Cir. Mar. 2, 2007) (reversing denial 
of motion for judgment as a matter of law in excessive force case where trial court analyzed the
issue of the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions from the “wrong perspective,” namely the 
plaintiff’s); Smith-Walker v. Zielinski, No. IP-01-0343-C-T/K, 2003 WL 21254221, at *3 (S.D. 
Ind. Apr. 29, 2003) (rejecting defendants’ arguments that evidence of plaintiff’s state of mind was 
relevant to determination of liability for use of excessive force and specifically rejecting evidence
of her psychiatric history on such issue). 
293 Generally, evidence offered of a person’s “state of mind” consists of actions and statements
that are contemporaneous with the incident for which such state of mind is relevant. See, e.g.,
FED. R. EVID. 803(3) (establishing exception to prohibition against hearsay for evidence of a
declarant’s “then existing state of mind” (emphasis added)).  As noted supra notes 166-167 and 
accompanying text, the court accepted the defendant’s assertion that the evidence was probative
of the plaintiff’s damages claim. Bemben, 1995 WL 27223, at *3. The court also rejected the 
plaintiff’s arguments that the evidence should be excluded under Rule 404 for unfair prejudice.
Id. at *2. 
294 Lowe v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 123, 125 (E.D. Pa. 1984).  The defense
sought to offer the psychiatric testimony on the issues of liability and damages. The plaintiff
asked the court to bifurcate the liability and damages portions of the trial, apparently hoping that
the psychiatric testimony would be excluded from the liability phase. Id.
295 Id.
296 The plaintiff in Lowe alleged that she was “denied [a] promotion to an outside advertising
sales position because of her race and that she was retaliated against for bringing an earlier 
administrative complaint of race discrimination.”  Id. at 124.  Given such allegations, the quality 
of the plaintiff’s job performance would be a primary issue at trial.
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more significantly, the evidence would “corroborate” the testimony of 
various defense fact witnesses who interacted with the plaintiff.297 
Other courts have been appropriately wary of the use of psychiatric 
evidence by civil defendants for the express purpose of suggesting that 
the plaintiff had a particular mental “state” at a given moment.  For 
example, in Parker v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., the district 
court excluded the defendant’s proffered evidence of the plaintiff’s 
psychiatric history.298  In that employment retaliation case, the 
defendant argued that such evidence would rebut the plaintiff’s 
assertion that she was a good employee.  Offering no analysis, the court 
excluded the psychiatric history as inadmissible character evidence.299 
In many cases in which defendants offer psychiatric evidence of a 
plaintiff for credibility or character purposes, and most particularly in 
employment discrimination cases, such evidence points to a plaintiff’s 
alleged “personality disorder.”  The diagnostic criteria for personality 
disorders employ terminology that resembles negative characterizations
of an individual, particularly with respect to social functioning, but are 
thinly veiled as medical evidence.300 Personality disorders have an
uncertain place in psychiatry.301  Indeed, there is debate regarding
whether personality disorders are in fact properly characterized as a 
form of “mental illness” or are really little more than groupings of 
297 Id. at 126. Another example of a court’s expansive view of the relevancy of psychiatric 
evidence with little regard for the prejudicial nature of such evidence is in Koch v. Koch Indus., 2 
F. Supp. 2d 1385 (D. Kan. 1998), a shareholder suit brought by one brother against the
corporation operated by the other brothers.  The court denied the plaintiff’s motion in limine on 
relevance and Rule 403 grounds to exclude evidence of his psychotherapy treatment.  The court 
ruled that the evidence was potentially relevant to show his “hatred and distrust” of his brothers
and his “efforts or actions as a result of these feelings.” Id. at 1393. 
298 Parker v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., Civ. A. No. 04-1206-MLB, 2007 WL 1018802, at *4 
(D. Kan. Apr. 2, 2007). 
299 Id. 
300 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 64, at 685-729 (setting forth diagnostic criteria 
for personality disorders).  For example, the diagnostic criteria for “Narcissistic Personality
Disorder” include the following traits: 
(1) [A] grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g., exaggerates achievements and talents,
expects to be recognized as superior without commensurate achievements) . . .  
(3) believes that he or she is “special” and unique and can only be understood by, or
should associate with, other special or high-status people (or institutions) . . .  
(5) has a sense of entitlement, i.e., unreasonable expectations of especially favorable
treatment or automatic compliance with his or her expectations 
(6) is interpersonally exploitative, i.e., takes advantage of others to achieve his or her 
own ends . . .  
(9) shows arrogant, haughty behaviors or attitudes.
Id. at 717. Trial courts admitted evidence of such disorder in Lanni v New Jersey, 177 F.R.D. 
295, 302-03 (D.N.J. 1998), discussed supra at note 230 and accompanying text, and Sudtelgte v. 
Reno, No. 90-1016-CV-W-6, 1994 WL 3406, at *12-13 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 3, 1994), discussed supra
at notes 235-241 and accompanying text. 
301 See Deirdre M. Smith, The Paradox of Personality: Mental Illness, Employment
Discrimination, and The Americans with Disabilities Act, 17 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 79,
81-92 (2006). 
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particular personality traits that have a negative impact on social 
functioning.302  The diagnoses are arguably circular since, by the
establishment of such diagnoses, psychiatry has pathologized those 
people who have personalities most of us find abhorrent, and then gives 
such pathology the badge of “science” and “medicine” because of its 
inclusion in the DSM.303  In this respect, personality disorders provide 
an example of how psychiatric diagnoses are normatively defined and
serve as little more than descriptions of “patterns of attitudes, emotions,
behaviors, and personality traits.”304 
Grouping clusters of personality and character traits into diagnostic 
criteria and offering them through a psychologist or psychiatrist lends
these descriptions “an additional aura of objectivity” at trial.305  We saw 
in Bemben, for example, how a court categorically excluded “diagnosed
ailments” from character evidence.306 Other courts, however, have 
noted that, notwithstanding the presence of a diagnosis, evidence of 
plaintiff’s personality disorder may run afoul of the character evidence 
prohibition. In Bonner, discussed supra in Part II, the court rejected
evidence of a plaintiff’s personality disorder for purposes of raising 
questions about her credibility because the court concluded that it was 
essentially character evidence, due in part to the inclusion of 
“deceitfulness” in the diagnostic criteria.307 
Where admitted, evidence of personality disorders is especially
valuable for defendants because the inflexible nature of such disorders 
suggests that they are long-standing, and the diagnostic criteria can
paint an especially unflattering picture of the plaintiff.308  A defense-
oriented treatise on litigating emotional and mental damages claims in
employment discrimination devotes an entire chapter to “Personality
Disorders in Employment Litigation.”309  The author of that chapter 
302 See e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 79 (1992) (commenting that the defendant, who
had been diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder, was “not suffering from a mental disease
or illness”); Bruce J. Winick, Ambiguities in the Legal Meaning and Significance of Mental
Illness, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 534, 557-58 (1995) (discussing the Foucha court’s refusal
to consider antisocial personality disorder as a mental illness).
303 As one group of commentators cautioned: “Psychiatric diagnosis provides a ‘Good 
Housekeeping Seal of Approval,’ which appears to validate the relevance and the reliability of
expert testimony in a language that seems familiar, yet professional.”  Greenberg et al., supra
note 83, at 7. 
304 Id. at 9. 
305 Id.
306 See supra notes 287-293 and accompanying text. 
307 Bonner v. Falcon Drilling Co., No. 95-4077, 1997 WL 162042, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 4, 
1997); see supra notes 254-256 and accompanying text. 
308  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 64, at 686 (noting that the “particular personality
features” of personality disorders are “evident by early adulthood”); see also Lipian, supra note 
199, at 220; Stumo et al., supra note 66, at 1315. 
309 Lipian, supra note 199, at 212-61. 
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outlines the particular benefits to defendants of raising a plaintiff’s 
personality disorder: 
Certain qualities inherent in the personality disorders mean that these 
disorders frequently have a pivotal role in the health (or ill health) of
a workplace environment, and consequently in employment 
litigation.  Personality disorders produce cognitive distortions and 
unreasonable expectations and demands that may impact liability
issues in an employment lawsuit.  They lead to social dysfunction, 
boundary violation and permeability, and a tendency toward passive-
aggressive control that may undermine employee morale and create 
factions and alienation in the workforce.  Certain personality 
disorders can give rise to intense rage, acute exacerbation of baseline
characterologic tendencies, and heightened impairment of impulse
control, leading to retaliatory behavior and even potential 
violence.310 
Indeed, it is not uncommon in civil litigation to see dueling
forensic psychiatrists where the plaintiff’s expert has diagnosed PTSD
or depression and the defendant’s expert rejects such diagnoses (or
alternatively asserts that such conditions pre-date the incident in
question and are the true predominant cause of the plaintiff’s mental 
injury) and instead offers a diagnosis of a personality disorder.311 
Empirical studies confirm that “advocacy bias” on the part of the
examining expert may dictate diagnostic profiles.  One study reviewed 
the diagnoses of plaintiffs by examining psychiatrists retained by the 
plaintiff and by the defense in forty-seven sexual harassment cases.312 
Remarkably, the defense experts diagnosed plaintiffs with a personality 
disorder in thirty-five of the forty-seven cases, compared with only five 
such diagnoses by plaintiffs’ experts.313 Moreover, some commentators 
310 Id. at 219. 
311 See e.g., Nichols v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 154 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. 1998); Katt v. City of New 
York, 151 F. Supp. 2d 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Chrissafis v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., No. 95-C-5080,
1998 WL 100307 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 1998); Burns v. Republic Sav. Bank, 25 F. Supp. 2d 809
(N.D. Ohio 1998); Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C. 1988).  There is reason to 
question arguments that a defendant is entitled to offer evidence of a plaintiff’s personality 
disorder solely because the plaintiff offered evidence of PTSD or a similar diagnosis to support
her claim for damages, akin to the door-opening argument discussed supra in Part I.D.  A  
diagnosis of underlying personality disorder is not a clear rebuttal to a PTSD diagnosis offered by
plaintiff’s expert in support of a claim for damages.
312 Barbara L. Long, Psychiatric Diagnoses in Sexual Harassment Cases, 22 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L., 195, 196-97 (1994). 
313 Id. Advocacy bias is also suggested by the plaintiffs’ experts diagnoses of PTSD in
seventeen cases compared with two such diagnoses by defense examiners. Id. at 197-98. While 
the examiners overlapped in diagnosing anxiety and depressive disorders, there was almost no
overlap in the diagnosis of PTSD and personality disorders. Id. at 197. In Spencer v. General 
Electric Co., the experts presented conflicting personality disorder diagnoses.  697 F. Supp. 204,
211 (E.D. Va. 1988).  The plaintiff’s expert opined that plaintiff had a preexisting personality
disorder but it rendered her more susceptible to the defendant’s harassment and led her to develop
posttraumatic stress disorder. The defendant’s expert, however, diagnosed her with “histrionic
personality disorder” which, he explained, “develops over a lifetime and is characterized by 
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have suggested that the role of personality disorders in sexual 
harassment cases may be overestimated.314  Another commentator noted
that being subjected to sexual harassment (and participating in related
litigation) can result in “personality changes” such that female plaintiffs
are “observed to be unstable, histrionic and paranoid.”315 
Another form of “personality” evidence offered by some
defendants consists of results of “personality testing” such as the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI-2).316  In  
Chrissafis v. Continental Airlines, Inc., a case in which the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant subjected her to false arrest and
imprisonment, the defendant obtained a court-ordered psychiatric 
examination of plaintiff, including the administration of the MMPI-2.317 
The defense expert’s report of the test results contained several negative 
characterizations of the plaintiff, including a statement that the results of 
the test were “‘typical of an individual who is defensive, lacks insight, 
may be an unreliable historian, and tends to deny the existence or
importance of unfavorable traits.’”318 The court nonetheless accepted 
the defendant’s argument that such evidence was relevant and would 
assist the jury in determining damages, reasoning: “Dr. Grote’s
testimony . . . will aid the jury in understanding that Chrissafis might
have had other psychological problems unrelated to the July 1994 
incident.”319 
immaturity, shallowness, self-centeredness, obsession with one’s personal appearance and 
exaggerated emotionality.” Id.
314  FOOTE & GOODMAN-DELAHUNTY, supra note 98, at 109-10. Psychologists Foote and
Goddman-Delahunty conclude from their review of the applicable data: “[T]he presence of 
personality disorder and severely disturbed behavioral traits may account for a few cases of false
or unsubstantiated sexual harassment complaints. . . .  However, these cases will be extremely
rare and are easily distinguished from the more frequent experience of unwanted workplace
sexual conduct . . . .”  Id. at 110. 
315  GOLD, supra note 103, at 76, 188.  Also, the dynamic present in forensic psychiatric or 
psychological examinations for the defense may result in a plaintiff’s appearing “surly and 
suspicious” during the examination. MELTON ET AL., supra note 9, at 414. 
316 See generally Smith, supra note 301, at 125-29. Cf. Dennis P. Saccuzzo, Still Crazy After
All These Years: California’s Persistent Use of the MMPI As Character Evidence in Criminal 
Cases, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 379, 400 (1999) (reviewing court rulings on the admissibility of MMPI
results in criminal cases).  Saccuzzo argues, “MMPI profiles were never meant to be used to
determine the specific actions of any given individual at any given time.” Id.
317 Chrissafis v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., No. 95-C-5080, 1998 WL 100307 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 
1998). 
318 Id. at *1; see also Sierra v. Little River Mem’l Hosp., No. CA91-474, 1992 WL 348419, at
*2 (Ark. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1992) (affirming decision by workers compensation panel that 
considered evidence that MMPI-2 test of claimant revealed “manipulative tendencies” and led
examining physician to conclude that he was malingering). 
319 Chrissafis, 1998 WL 100307, at *1.  The court, however, excluded any reference to the 
MMPI-2’s “lie scale” as being “more prejudicial than probative.”  Id. at *2.  In contrast to the  
Chrissafis opinion, in Usher v. Lakewood Engineering & Manufacturing. Co., 158 F.R.D. 411
(N.D. Ill. 1994), the trial court granted a protective order to the plaintiff in that employment 
discrimination case, preventing the defendant’s forensic psychologist from administering a series 
of psychological tests, including the MMPI-2 and other personality tests, for use by its forensic
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These cases illustrate how many courts set a low bar for defendants 
to assert a purportedly permissible use of psychiatric evidence—such as 
to impeach credibility or to suggest alternative causation of damages. 
This is frequently the case even where the evidence consists largely of 
descriptions of the plaintiff’s negative character traits, often wrapped in
the guise of expert diagnoses, that are highly suggestive of a 
predisposition to being a poor employee, troublemaker, or an otherwise 
unlikeable individual and, ultimately, therefore, an undeserving 
plaintiff. 
IV. LAYPEOPLE, PSYCHIATRIC EVIDENCE, AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION
Our evidence rules contain few outright prohibitions on the 
admissibility of evidence of a plaintiff’s psychiatric illness.  Where a 
defendant can articulate any basis for the relevancy of the evidence for 
history of mental disorder, such evidence is admissible in principle and 
is usually admitted in fact.  But can or should we trust fact finders,
whether judges or jurors, to use psychiatric evidence appropriately, or is 
there something sufficiently unique about its use that requires an 
additional layer of caution before courts admit such evidence?  My 
conclusion, based upon the foregoing review, is that three distinct and
underappreciated dangers presented by such evidence warrant closer 
scrutiny of its use. 
Perhaps the foremost danger is that, when presented with evidence
of a plaintiff’s psychiatric history or condition, regardless of the 
purported basis for its admissibility, the fact finder will draw 
inappropriate and prejudicial inferences regarding the plaintiff’s 
character and credibility as a result of the persistent stigmatization of 
mental illness that continues to permeate American society.  As one 
group of commentators warned with respect to the use of psychiatric 
evidence in litigation: “There is overwhelming evidence that being 
labeled with a psychiatric diagnosis changes people’s view of 
individuals.  There is no reason to believe that this prejudice does not 
transfer into the courtroom.”320 
psychiatric expert. Without revealing the substance of the arguments, the court concluded that 
the plaintiff had demonstrated “the inadequacy of the correlation factors and the validity factors”
of the tests at issue, and that, under a Rule 403 balancing test, the testimony that would result
from such testing should be excluded.  Id. at 413-14; see Theodore H. Blau, Psychological Tests
in the Courtroom, in  PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURIES AT TRIAL, supra note 28, at 1473, 1477 (“The
issues and questions surrounding concerns about racial and cultural biases in the use of 
psychological tests are complex and as yet not yet settled.”).  For further discussion of personality
testing see Smith, supra note 301, at 125-29 and ZISKIN, supra note 84, at 774-884. 
320 Greenberg et al., supra note 83, at 10 (internal citation omitted).
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
  
  
   
       
  
 
    
   
     
  
   
2010] DISORDERED A N D DISC RE DITE D PLAINTIFF  809 
Psychologist Stephen Hinshaw recently reviewed and analyzed
research across a broad range of fields including social psychology, 
history, sociology, and evolutionary psychology regarding the 
pervasiveness of the stigma associated with mental illness.321  He  
observed: “During the past decade a consensus has formed among
research and clinical experts, as well as policy and political leaders, that 
mental disorders are, in fact highly stigmatized, with far-reaching
consequences.”322  He also notes that the long-standing history and
pervasiveness of such stigma is cause for pessimism as “[e]xclusion and 
dehumanization of those with mental disorder have been primary
responses for far too long.”323  In fact, some studies suggest that mental 
illness is even more stigmatizing today than it was in the middle of the 
last century,324 and that the presence of a medical diagnosis does not in
fact evoke the “empathic” (rather than blaming) responses we might 
otherwise expect.325  Those with less severe forms of mental illness are 
not spared from stigma; it may simply appear in a different form since 
these otherwise “normal”-appearing individuals may be assumed to lack 
self-control and self-restraint.326 
Sociologist Erving Goffman, in his classic study of stigma, noted 
that the term can be defined as “an attribute that is deeply
discrediting.”327  In other words, the essential effect of stigma is to be 
discredited, and therefore dehumanized and disempowered.328 This is
harmful in numerous aspects of a person’s life, of course, but it has a
particularly profound effect on a person’s attempt to seek remedial relief
through civil litigation, and particularly in civil rights and
discrimination claims where witness credibility is quite often the central
issue for a fact finder to resolve. 
Legal scholars have written extensively on the impact of stigma
associated with mental illness.329  U.S. Court of Appeals Judge David L.
321  STEPHEN P. HINSHAW, THE MARK OF SHAME: STIGMA OF MENTAL ILLNESS AND AN
AGENDA FOR CHANGE 28-52, 93-114 (2007). 
322 Id. at 140. 
323 Id. at 71-72. 
324 Id. at 102, 151. 
325 Id. at 33, 84-91; see also HORWITZ & WAKEFIELD, supra note 64, at 23 (“There is in fact 
scant scientific evidence on whether diagnosis does lead to beneficial relief from personal blame, 
in contrast to the vast evidence that it leads to harmful stigma.”).
326  HINSHAW, supra note 321, at 155-56; see also SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH
SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF
THE SURGEON GENERAL 6-8 (1999) (discussing the root causes and persistence of stigmatization
of people with mental illness in the United States).
327  ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 3 
(1963). 
328 Id. at 5 (“[W]e believe the person with a stigma is not quite human.”).
329 See, e.g., MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL
21-24, 39-43 (2000) (describing the nature and pervasiveness of “sanism”); SUSAN STEFAN,
UNEQUAL RIGHTS: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES AND THE
     
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
  
  
    
 
    
    
   
 
  
 
810 CARDOZO LAW RE VIEW  [Vol. 31:3 
Bazelon, writing for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Colombia Circuit in Smith v. Schelsinger, observed: 
A . . . reason for providing more stringent procedural safeguards in 
cases involving mental illness is that a finding of mental illness is 
unfortunately seen by many as a stigma. . . .  The enlightened view is 
that mental illness is a disease similar to any physical ailment of the
body and a condition for which there should be no blame or stigma. 
But we cannot blind ourselves to the fact that at present, despite lip
service to the contrary, this enlightened view is not always observed 
in practice.330 
Thus, there can be little question that presenting a fact finder with 
evidence of a litigant’s current or prior mental illness triggers such 
stigma. 
The second danger of admitting psychiatric evidence is that fact 
finders will assign inappropriate authority, weight, and significance to 
evidence of mental illness, and particularly to psychiatric diagnoses. 
Fact finders presented with evidence of such diagnoses are expected to 
consider it in reaching conclusions with respect to events, motives,
credibility, causation, damages, and other specific factual disputes at 
issue in a given civil case.  However, psychiatric diagnoses are ill-suited
to serve as evidence in civil litigation.  As discussed above, psychiatric 
diagnosis may reflect bias that is nonetheless undetectable by fact 
finders and untestable in litigation.331  Some commentators have 
criticized the DSM, particularly as implemented by the psychiatric 
profession, as reflecting stereotypes and prejudices either towards 
groups of individuals (based on race or gender) or specific 
individuals.332  Some regard the DSM as being “infused with value
choices.”333 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 5 (2001) (“Social science research confirms that mental 
illness is one of the most—if not the most—stigmatized of social conditions.”); Michael E.
Waterstone & Michael Ashley Stein, Disabling Prejudice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1351, 1363-64 
(2008) (“Individuals with psycho-social disabilities historically have been among the most 
excluded members of society. . . .  Research firmly establishes that people with mental disabilities
are subjected to greater prejudice than are people with physical disabilities.”); cf. Karen M.
Markin, Still Crazy After All These Years: The Enduring Defamatory Power of Mental Illness, 29
L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 155, 155-56, 158-60 (2005) (discussing the continuing “paradoxical” stigma
associated with mental illness).
330 Smith v. Schlesinger, 513 F.2d 462, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
331 Faust & Ziskin, supra note 142, at 35 (“[Psychiatric e]xpert evidence is readily subject to
abuse due to its highly subjective nature and vulnerability to biases.”). 
332 See Campbell, supra note 65, at 438 (noting studies that suggest “black patients are 
diagnosed as schizophrenic more frequently than white patients”). 
333 Shuman, supra note 198, at 225; ZISKIN, supra note 84, at 142 (“It is important to realize 
that this infusion of values into the definition or identification of mental disorder represents a 
very serious problem.”); see also Smith, 513 F.2d at 475 n.45, 477 (Bazelon, J.) (“The literature
concerning the impact of social value judgments on psychiatric diagnoses is immense” and 
“psychiatric judgments may disguise, wittingly or unwittingly, political or social biases of the 
psychiatrist; and excessive reliance on diagnoses will pre-empt the primary role of legal decision-
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Psychiatric diagnoses may also suggest a level of certainty and 
confidence that could mislead jurors who are unaware of the limited
significance of such labels and instead base legal determinations upon
them, as some courts have done in the cases discussed supra. The 
diagnoses are essentially descriptions of clinical symptoms for purposes
of making treatment decisions, facilitating communication between 
professionals, and, in many instances, triggering insurance coverage.334 
Psychiatric diagnoses, on the whole, provide less reliable information
than do other medical diagnoses.335  The lack of consistency in 
diagnoses between examiners is well documented,336 and the diagnostic
categories do not, for the most part, “reflect a coherent progression of 
empirical research.”337 
In successive drafts, the DSM’s editors have issued increasingly 
strong caveats about the use of the DSM in legal settings.338  More  
recently, commentators have suggested that, unless a psychiatric 
diagnosis is required to fulfill a legal element of a claim or defense, 
courts and expert witnesses avoid altogether the admission of DSM
diagnoses at trial “as circumstantial evidence of a condition or an
event.”339  In personal injury cases specifically, they explain: 
[T]he fact finder is asked to assess damages including pain and 
suffering, as well the loss of ability to perform certain functions.  A 
psychiatric diagnosis is not the physical and mental distress suffered 
makers.”).
334 See, e.g., AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 64, at 1 (noting that the United States
Health Care Finance Administration mandates use of the DSM’s codes “for purposes of
reimbursement” and that many private insurers require use of the codes as well); HORWITZ &
WAKEFIELD, supra note 64, at 99 (noting that the aim within psychiatry of creating a “valid 
diagnostic system” was to enable clinicians to “categorize different syndromes accurately and
thereby . . . predict course and response to treatment”); ZISKIN, supra note 84, at 182 (noting that 
the stated purpose of the DSM-IV is “to provide clear descriptions of diagnostic categories to 
enable clinicians and researchers to diagnose, communicate about, study and treat people with
mental disorders”); Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of 
Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 601-04 (1978) (arguing that evidence offered by 
mental health expert witnesses should be limited because the goals of clinical evaluation are so 
different from those of legal decision-making). 
335 Greenberg et al., supra note 83, at 3.  A relatively high rate of co-morbidity of mental 
disorders—that is, the association of two or more diagnoses with an individual patient—of forty-
five percent provides an additional layer of complexity to psychiatric diagnosis. Mental 
Disorders Exact Heavy Toll on Young People, According to the Second National Comorbidity 
Survey, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 885, 885 (2005), available at
http://www.psychservices.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/reprint/56/7/885. 
336 Campbell, supra note 65, at 437; Faust & Ziskin, supra note 142, at 31-32. 
337 Greenberg et al., supra note 83, at 5. 
338 See, e.g., AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 64, at xxxvii; see also, e.g., ZISKIN, supra
note 84, at 476-77 (arguing that psychiatric diagnoses and data drawn from psychiatric
evaluations are not sufficiently reliable and valid for use in legal settings); Greenberg et al., supra
note 83, at 6. 
339 Greenberg et al., supra note 83, at 11-13; see also Noah, supra note 67, at 303-05 (noting
litigation’s distorting influence on diagnosis and suggesting that medical diagnoses be kept out of
court testimony to “delink” this effect). 
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from an injury, nor is it pain, suffering, and the inability to perform
certain functions.  Such diagnosis is, at best, a categorization of the 
pain, suffering, or distress.  But it is in no way a measure of the
inability to perform certain functions.  To determine that issue, the 
fact finder must know the plaintiff’s relevant pre- and postevent 
capabilities and performance.340 
By admitting evidence of these tools designed for mental health
professionals as part of legal fact finding (including credibility
determinations), we are essentially asking laypeople to engage in
analyses of which even those within the field of psychiatry are 
somewhat wary.  We have already seen that the determination of
causation in psychiatry is a process that has little in common with 
causation analyses in the law.  Psychiatry’s approach to causation is a
complex inquiry, requiring highly specialized knowledge and which
does not seek definitive conclusions.  We certainly cannot expect jurors 
and judges to use evidence of alternate causation in a way that is 
consistent with psychiatric practice.  But by permitting psychiatric 
history and diagnoses to be admitted at trial for causation and 
apportionment analyses, we trust fact finders to use such evidence 
appropriately, even in the absence of guiding principles.341 
The use of expert psychiatric testimony at trial also exemplifies the
twin hazards of expert evidence described by Professor Jennifer 
Mnookin; namely, that expert testimony may be highly biased but fact 
finders are generally unable to detect and to assess such bias.342  She  
explains that, under our current system, parties select and retain the 
expert witnesses who testify at trial based largely upon an expert’s
potential ability to persuade the jury to rule for that party.343  The  
assumption, which she labels as the “sporting theory of justice,” is that 
such biases are not dangerous because the adversarial process will 
ultimately yield reliable evidence.344  However, this mechanism is in 
fact quite limited since juries themselves lack the “epistemic
340 Greenberg et al., supra note 83, at 12; see also Daniel W. Shuman, Persistent
Reexperiences in Psychiatry and Law: Current and Future Trends for the Role of PTSD in
Litigation, in POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER IN LITIGATION: GUIDELINES FOR FORENSIC
ASSESSMENT 1, 7 (Robert I. Simon ed., 2d ed. 2003) (“Both Daubert and the DSM make clear
that it is not appropriate to assume that a psychiatric diagnosis is relevant to, let alone dispositive
of, an issue in a case.”). 
341 See Greenberg et al., supra note 83, at 11 (noting difficulty in analyzing the potential role 
of prior trauma where plaintiff alleges damages from PTSD); Lawrence J. Raifman, Problems of 
Diagnosis and Legal Causation in Courtroom Use of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 1 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 115, 123 (1983) (noting that, in cases of PTSD diagnosis, it is “extremely difficult to 
separate out the causal role” played by a preexisting condition). 
342 Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 73
BROOK. L. REV. 1009, 1012-15 (2008). 
343 Id. at 1012 (“The marketplace for experts cannot . . . be trusted to produce reliable 
information.”).
344 Id. at 1015. 
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competence” to evaluate expert testimony,345 and judges are similarly 
hampered when serving as gatekeepers of expert evidence pursuant to 
Daubert.346  Thus, while psychiatric evidence is infused with bias and 
value judgments, laypeople are in a poor position to evaluate the weight
to be given to such evidence. 
The third unique danger presented by the admission of psychiatric 
evidence is that fact finders may misuse such evidence because of an
assumption that they already have a good understanding of human
behavior. We all know what a “personality” is, but how well do we 
understand “personality disorders” as that term is recognized in 
psychiatry?  Similarly, the terms “depression,” “narcissistic,” 
“paranoia,” and even “PTSD” permeate common discourse but also
appear in psychiatric assessment of individuals.347  Many people likely 
hold common and fundamental misunderstandings about psychosis,
such as that people with schizophrenia have “split personalities,” are 
persistently delusional, and often violent.  One pair of commentators
noted that psychiatric experts’ “persuasive effort may well succeed
because [they] align[] so closely with common belief.”348  Some studies
have suggested that jurors are generally skeptical of expert psychiatric 
and psychological testimony, particularly on “syndrome evidence” and 
in criminal cases.349  However, in the context discussed here, the expert
evidence is sufficiently “scientific” to be admitted under Rule 702’s
limitations, while at the same time its content may resonate with fact 
finders’ own life experiences and therefore be more persuasive than
psychological or psychiatric evidence might be otherwise. 
Professor Frank C. Keil, a professor of psychology and linguistics,
observed that “it is not safe to assume that one’s novice intuitions about 
the complexity of phenomena are always accurate.”350  Rather, the 
presence of “systematic biases . . . heavily distort one’s intuitions into
thinking some classes of phenomena are much simpler than they really 
345 Id. at 1012-13; cf. S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 230 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3182, 3412 (recommending enactment of FED. R. EVID. 704(b) to eliminate the “confusing
spectacle” of conflicting psychiatric testimony on the “ultimate legal issue” in criminal trials).
346 Mnookin, supra note 342, at 1019. 
347 Paul R. McHugh & Glenn Treisman, PTSD: A Problematic Diagnostic Category, 21 J.
ANXIETY DISORDERS 211, 212 (2007) (observing that PTSD has become “a household word and 
courtroom plea”); LUHRMANN, supra note 65, at 20 (“[P]sychiatric knowledge seeps into popular
culture like the dye from a red shirt in hot water.”).
348 Faust & Ziskin, supra note 142, at 34. But see Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the 
Ken? Testing Jurors’ Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177 
(2006) (demonstrating with an empirical study that, in several important respects, prospective
jurors’ “common sense” understanding of how human memory works was in fact incorrect in 
light of psychological research on the same). 
349  SLOBOGIN, supra note 5, at 86. 
350 Frank C. Keil, Getting To The Truth: Grounding Incomplete Knowledge, 73 BROOK. L.
REV. 1035, 1046 (2008). 
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are.”351  Causation of psychological injuries, and indeed mental illness 
itself, certainly qualify as “phenomena” susceptible to biases regarding 
complexity.  Keil explains: 
Human cognition can cause both pitfalls and opportunities in our
efforts to get at the truth in a causally complex world in which 
deference and trust are essential.  The pitfalls revolve around the
ways in which individuals can be quite poor at recognizing their own
areas of weak understanding. . . .  We may also introduce systematic
distortions into our sense of where the deepest causal complexities in 
the world arise, with the result that we tend to underestimate the
complexity of psychological phenomena relative to most physical
ones.352 
In short, our current understanding of basic cognitive processing 
gives us good reason to be especially wary of laypeople’s use of
psychiatric evidence.  Indeed, some courts, such as that in Robinson v. 
Canon,353 simply do not trust jurors to make apportionment analyses in
the context of psychological injuries. 
These three dangers—namely, the stigmatizing effect of mental 
illness, the disconnection between legal and psychiatric concepts, and 
fact finders’ lack of appreciation of the complexity of evidence 
regarding mental illness—present a frank dilemma for courts.
Unquestionably, evidence of psychological injuries, including that 
offered through expert witnesses, is a core element of types of civil
litigation, including civil rights and discrimination claims.  As other
commentators have noted, it is not realistic to expect courts to entirely
prohibit expert testimony on psychological injuries, notwithstanding the 
fact that such testimony may not always meet the requirements of
Daubert and other tests of reliability.354  And indeed, doing so would
greatly limit the ability of plaintiffs to receive a full recovery for their 
injuries. Nor is it appropriate to preclude defendants entirely from
challenging the opinions of plaintiffs’ forensic expert witnesses, which 
could skew judgments in precisely the opposite direction.  A critical 
tension exists where some of the raw material that forensic 
psychologists and psychiatrists use to reach their conclusions about 
connections between events and psychological symptoms is susceptible 
to misuse by fact finders and unfair prejudice to litigants. 
Nonetheless, the unique dangers presented by psychiatric evidence
suggest that courts must revisit how they approach questions of 
admissibility of psychiatric evidence offered by a defendant to support 
his arguments on liability or damages.  First, courts should note that the 
351 Id.
 
352 Id. at 1051-52. 

353 Robinson v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., No. 99-0339-CV-W-3, 2000 WL 564203 (W.D. Mo. Apr.
 
6, 2000); see supra notes 190-193 and accompanying text. 
354 See supra notes 126-132 and accompanying text. 
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dangers discussed herein largely parallel those dangers that are already
set forth in Rule 403 as appropriate bases for courts to exercise their
discretion to limit otherwise relevant evidence: “unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.”355  Rule 403 sets up a
comparative analysis of the relative probative value of evidence against 
these dangers.356  The analysis necessarily begins with the question of 
relevance and courts must give far more scrutiny to the arguments for 
probative value than have generally been accepted. 
The three concepts examined here—causation, credibility, and
character—have particular meanings within the law.  As the conflicting 
case law on each of these concepts demonstrates, a plaintiff’s mental 
illness is not a necessary part of the construction of any of the three 
concepts, and therefore is not necessarily “relevant.”  Courts provide 
specific constructions in individual cases through the determination that 
a fact finder may consider certain evidence in reaching conclusions on 
disputes regarding alternate causation, witness credibility, and a 
plaintiff’s character.  With respect to each of these concepts, certain
courts have admitted psychiatric evidence while others have excluded it. 
Courts should, for example, scrutinize a defendant’s arguments 
that the psychiatric evidence is necessary to rebut an assertion in the
plaintiff’s case and should be particularly cautious about admitting such 
evidence on alternative causation theories. In some cases, the only
proof offered by a plaintiff to support a claim for emotional distress is 
her own testimony, or perhaps that of a treating psychotherapist who 
describes her symptoms and treatment.  If a plaintiff does not offer more 
than that, that should result in a corresponding limitation on the ability
of the defendant to seize an opportunity to take an “anything goes” 
approach to attacking the plaintiff’s claim. If the plaintiff does not offer 
an expert opinion on causation, then the door is not opened for the 
defendant to offer expert testimony on that issue.357 
Where a plaintiff offers a forensic expert who has conducted a 
comprehensive analysis of her psychological injuries, including a 
conclusion about the causal link between her symptoms and the event in 
question in the litigation, defendants may have a better relevancy
355  FED. R. EVID. 403. 
356 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 5214 (1978) (explaining the procedural means through which the policy of Rule
403 is to be carried out); cf. Christopher Slobogin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Trials: To 
Junk or Not To Junk?, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1998) (noting, with respect to the
admissibility of psychiatric evidence in criminal trials, that while Rules 401, 403, and 702
provide a “coherent analytical framework,” courts nonetheless “often fail to take one or more of
[the rules] seriously, or they add additional considerations that cloud the analysis”). 
357 This approach is consistent with the one I suggested with respect to determinations of 
waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.  A finding of waiver must be based upon the 
specific actions of the plaintiff, such as the evidence and arguments offered in support of her 
claim, rather than broader notions of relevancy.  Smith, supra note 6, at 143-47. 
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argument for the admissibility of evidence that may challenge, question, 
or undermine that forensic opinion.  However, even where a plaintiff 
offers expert evidence on causation, a court may nonetheless impose 
limitations on the evidence offered to rebut such testimony.  For 
example, courts should not admit evidence of alleged alternative
causation absent further proof that the proffered alternative cause in fact 
could account for the plaintiff’s symptoms rather than leaving that for 
speculation and assumption.  In most instances, a defendant can 
demonstrate this only through expert testimony.  Courts should demand
more precision from psychiatric expert witnesses on both sides with 
respect to causation arguments generally and should submit expert 
opinions of causation to at least some level of Daubert scrutiny to 
determine potential reliability. 
Also, as discussed earlier, there is an important distinction between 
offering evidence of specific life stressors along with expert testimony
explaining how such stressors could in fact account for the plaintiff’s 
symptoms and offering evidence of a psychiatric label or a history of 
mental health treatment for the plaintiff.  It is the latter forms of
evidence that pose the greatest dangers, have the weakest probative 
value, and therefore are candidates for exclusion under Rule 403. 
In addition, a court need not allow detailed exploration of an expert
witness’s causation analysis such that it admits testimony about a 
plaintiff’s mental illness.  Expert witness reports are generally not
admissible as evidence because they are hearsay.  Thus it is possible for 
an expert to provide a detailed explanation in her report of how she
arrived at her conclusion, while providing far less detail in in-court 
testimony.358  Indeed the mere fact that an expert witness uses certain 
facts or data in arriving at her conclusion does not render such
information admissible, and courts may not admit such facts and data
unless “their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the
expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.”359 
Turning to the defendant’s offer of psychiatric evidence on the 
issue of the plaintiff’s credibility at trial, courts should not admit such 
evidence for this purpose absent clear proof that a plaintiff has a 
psychiatric condition that, in her particular case, has a specific impact 
on her ability to perceive the events at issue and to recount those events 
358 See FED. R. EVID. 703 (permitting expert witness to offer opinion testimony even if the
underlying facts or data are inadmissible, and limiting the introduction at trial of such otherwise 
inadmissible facts and data).  While mental health professionals are not immune to the effects of 
society’s stigma of mental illness, we can assume that their choice of professions and immersion
in the field enable them to reach conclusions that are less influenced by stigma and prejudice.
Moreover, such examiners appreciate the complexities of human psychopathology when reaching
such conclusions. Thus, the questions of what information may be provided to an expert witness 
and to a fact finder are distinct. 
359 Id.
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at trial, a standard that very few could meet.360  Psychiatric labels do not
define a person’s capacity to offer truthful testimony; they are
descriptive classifications for use by the psychiatric field.  As with
causation inquiries, a psychiatric diagnosis or description of psychiatric 
treatment offers little probative value to fact finders on questions of 
credibility. 
While modern evidence rules contain broad prohibitions on the use
of character evidence in civil litigation to suggest propensities other
than truthfulness, courts nonetheless admit a good deal of psychiatric 
evidence strongly suggestive of character and easily misused for the 
purpose of drawing inferences about the plaintiff’s behavior and
conduct based upon a psychiatric diagnosis.  As discussed above, there 
are in fact few truly permissible uses of evidence of a plaintiff’s past or 
current psychiatric illness, and therefore courts should generally exclude 
evidence that contains negative characterizations of the plaintiff, such as
personality disorder diagnoses, even if—in fact, especially if—it is
presented in the context of expert testimony. 
If the proffered psychiatric evidence meets the low threshold of 
relevance under Rule 401, courts should nonetheless carefully evaluate 
the evidence to guard against the dangers delineated in Rule 403. 
Professor Aviva Orenstein has noted that Rule 403 “represents a key 
organizing principle for understanding the practical application and 
ethos” of the federal evidence rules, and that its “centrality to evidence 
law derives from the fact that it modifies almost every rule . . . and it 
epitomizes the trial judge’s vast discretion in admitting or excluding 
evidence, a hallmark of our judicial system.”361  Other commentators 
have suggested that one of the core functions of the rule has been to 
grant trial courts the discretion to exclude evidence that the common 
law’s more restrictive approach might have required to be excluded.362 
Psychiatric evidence exemplifies the dangers against which Rule
403’s drafters intended to guard.  The advisory committee’s notes
explain that the term “unfair prejudice” in the text of the rule means “an 
undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, 
though not necessarily, an emotional one.”363  The pervasive stigma
associated with mental illness is precisely the kind of “improper basis”
360 See, e.g., Smith-Walker v. Zielinski, No. IP-01-0343-C-T/K, 2003 WL 21254221, at *2
(S.D. Ind. Apr. 29, 2003) (rejecting argument that evidence of psychiatric history is admissible on
issue of credibility absent evidence that the condition has an impact on the plaintiff’s ability to
recount events); Kelly v. Ward, No. C-3-93-110, 1994 WL 1631041, *3 (S.D. Ohio July 6, 1994) 
(same); 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 124, § 6097 (noting the many dangers of admitted
evidence of a witness’s mental illness for purposes of impeaching credibility).
361 Aviva Orenstein, Deviance, Due Process, and the False Promise of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1487, 1512-13 (2005). 
362 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 356, § 5212. 
363  FED. R. EVID. 403, adv. comm. notes. 
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for decision-making that judges should minimize through use of the 
rule. 
Although the discussion arose in the context of a criminal case, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s exhortation to lower
courts in United States v. Lopez to invoke their discretion to limit the 
improper use of psychiatric evidence to gain an advantage in litigation
makes an equally strong case for scrutinizing civil litigant’s use of such 
evidence.364  The appeals court noted: “One’s psychiatric history is an
area of great personal privacy which can only be invaded in cross-
examination when required in the interests of justice.”365  Rule 403, the
court held, provides courts with the discretion to deny a litigant’s “free
wheeling inquiry intended to stigmatize the witness,” absent a showing 
of “real relevancy to his mental qualification as a witness.”366 Since
mental illness can easily trigger sentiments of dissonance and fear, 
courts should not underestimate how such evidence will sway fact
finders, including judges.
The risk of “misuse” of psychiatric evidence or “confusion of the 
issues” is also quite high and may well outweigh its probative value to a 
greater degree than is generally assumed by most judges.367  The  
Supreme Court noted in Daubert, quoting an article by Judge Jack
Weinstein: “Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading 
because of the difficulty in evaluating it.  Because of this risk, the judge 
in weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 
of the present rules exercises more control over experts than over lay 
witnesses.”368  As demonstrated in the cases discussed supra, we see
how fact finders can easily use evidence purportedly offered only with 
respect to causation issues to discount a plaintiff’s credibility and to 
make assumptions about her character.369 
Courts must also give due consideration to the fact that, while 
evidence may be admissible for one purpose rather than another (such
as being admissible to suggest alternative causes of emotional distress 
damages rather than as character evidence, for example), such careful 
364 United States v. Lopez, 611 F.2d 44, 45 (4th Cir. 1979). 
365 Id.
366 Id. at 46-47. Courts also have discretion to limit the use of psychiatric evidence pursuant 
to Rule 611(a) to “protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.”  FED. R. EVID. 
611(a); see also In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557, 572-73 (Cal. 1970) (noting that “court 
supervision” of the admissibility of psychiatric evidence at trial is important to prevent 
“substantially more harm than benefit” from the use of such evidence). 
367 Such misuse of evidence and/or confusion of the issues may be another source of “unfair 
prejudice.”  See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 162, at §§ 4:12-4:14 (observing that the
three specific “dangers” identified in Rule 403 are not clearly defined and frequently overlap). 
368 Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (quoting Jack B.
Weinstein, Rule 702 of The  Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 
F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991)). 
369 See supra notes 149-172 and accompanying text.  
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distinctions are likely to be utterly meaningless in the minds of jurors 
and therefore in jury deliberations, regardless of the limiting instruction
offered by the court. Indeed, research suggests that the stigma
associated with mental and the cognitive processes such as those
described by Professor Keil are likely immune to such limiting
instructions.370  In his caution about the use of limiting instructions 
seventy-five years ago, Justice Cardozo noted that “It is for ordinary
minds, and not for psychoanalysts, that our rules of evidence are
framed.”371  Although he did not issue this reminder with respect to
psychiatric testimony specifically, Justice Cardozo’s point is 
particularly pertinent to instances where “ordinary minds” are 
essentially asked to think as psychiatric professionals by using
psychiatric evidence for a strictly narrow analytic legal purpose.  Courts 
should also ensure that, where they admit psychiatric evidence, they
guard against cumulative evidence, which may increase the prospects of 
misuse.372 
In addition to excluding evidence where limiting instructions 
would not avert the dangers presented by particular evidence, trial 
courts may use other mechanisms to minimize the dangers identified in
Rule 403.  If a defendant proposes to offer psychiatric evidence on the
issue of alternative causation of damages, a judge can bifurcate the 
liability and damages portions of the trial.  Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 42(b), for example, permits bifurcation in the discretion of
the court “to avoid prejudice,” among other reasons.373  The trial court
in Smith-Walker v. Zielinski, an excessive force case, raised the issue of 
bifurcation of the trial between liability and damages after noting that
the plaintiff’s psychiatric condition “was being magnified as a potential 
issue to the point that it was interfering with the initial appropriate focus 
of the trial, that is, whether the Plaintiff can prove that the Defendants 
used excessive force in arresting her on the night in question.”374  The 
court rejected the defendants’ arguments that evidence of the plaintiff’s 
condition was relevant to her credibility, and therefore the defendants’
liability, but agreed that such evidence was relevant to the issue of
370 See RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 384 (2001) (“Empirical evidence 
as well as common sense suggests that courts greatly exaggerate the efficacy of limiting
instructions.”); VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 179, at 162-64 (describing empirical research
finding that jurors were unable to understand and follow instructions limiting use of evidence for 
credibility rather than character evidence purposes).
371 Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933). 
372 See FED. R. EVID. 403 (evidence may be excluded to prevent the “needless presentation of
cumulative evidence”); Kelly v. Ward, No. C-3-93-110, 1994 WL 1631041, *5 (S.D. Ohio July 6,
1994). 
373  FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b).
374 Smith-Walker v. Zielinski, No. IP-01-0343-C-T/K, 2003 WL 21254221, at *1 (S.D. Ind. 
Apr. 29, 2003). 
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damages.375 The court acknowledged that “[t]he ill-deserved but
perceived taint of mental illness is not uncommon” but that bias in 
individual jurors would be almost impossible to detect.376  Such “taint,”
the court feared, may lead some jurors to “infer that a person suffering 
from a mental illness or emotional disturbance should not be believed,”
and therefore the court ordered the bifurcation over the defendants’
objections.377 The court ruled that evidence of the plaintiff’s psychiatric
condition was irrelevant to the issues of liability and therefore would be 
excluded entirely from that portion of the trial.378  Bifurcation is a 
particularly appropriate means to limit misuse and unfair prejudice 
since, as discussed supra, defendants offer and courts admit psychiatric
evidence most often to support defendants’ arguments on damages
while many of the dangers posed by the evidence occur when the fact
finder uses it improperly to determine liability. 
Trial court judges, therefore, have several tools available at their
discretion to ensure that society’s problematic views of mental illness
and human behavior do not influence the outcome in civil proceedings 
to the disadvantage of those who have been identified as mentally ill.379 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys should demand that judges use such tools more 
often so that our civil trials do not become occasions to exploit and
perpetuate the stigmatization of those with mental illness, and defense 
attorneys should consider whether injecting the issue of a person’s
mental condition is an ethical and appropriate trial strategy.380 
375 Id. at *2. 
376 The court was wary of including questions aimed at uncovering such bias during voir dire. 
Id. at *4. 
377 Id.; cf. York v. AT&T Co., 95 F.3d 948, 958 (10th Cir. 1996) (affirming trial court’s
refusal to bifurcate trial where defendant sought to introduce evidence of plaintiff’s prior
psychiatric hospitalization on the issue of alternate causation of damages and noting that such
decisions “must be made with regard to judicial efficiency, judicial resources, and the likelihood
that a single proceeding will unduly prejudice either party or confuse the jury”).
378 Smith-Walker, 2003 WL 21254221, at *6, *8.  However, the court indicated that it would 
admit such evidence during the damages portion of the trial. Id. at *7. Another tool employed by
many courts where there may be complex and conflicting psychological testimony at trial is to 
hold a judicial settlement conference with the parties or to order the parties to participate in
mediation. Indeed, one forensic psychologist has suggested to me that, in part due to the dangers 
described in this Article, cases involving psychological injuries may be best resolved through 
alternative dispute resolution rather than trials.  Telephone Interview with Dr. William Foote
(Nov. 10, 2008). 
379 While the notion of unfair prejudice is usually associated with jury trials, research suggests
that judges are little better than jurors at basing factual determinations on the evidence that they
are legally permitted to consider. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 179, at 164 (describing empirical 
research that revealed that “judges—like the rest of us—are affected by anchors and other
cognitive illusions”); Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries 
(Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 27 (1997). 
380 Professor Anthony Alfieri, for example, has written extensively on the improper use of
racial imagery and rhetoric in criminal trials.  Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEX. L. REV. 
1293, 1305-23 (1998). 
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CONCLUSION
While there may be a long history of permitting fact finders to
consider mental illness as part of the equation when resolving
controversies in civil litigation, I suggest that we consider the broader 
question of whether, in light of our understanding of both the tenuous 
nature and the stigmatizing effect of psychiatric labeling, such practice 
should continue.  Exclusionary rules of evidence, including Rules 403
and 404, are part of a normative system of legal rules.  Such normative 
system assumes that we consider the impact of the rules not only in 
individual cases but also on a broader societal basis.381  Courts’ 
determinations of the relevance of an individual’s mental illness to 
resolving legal questions regarding causation, credibility, and character 
have implications in terms of both the outcomes for the parties as well
as the broader statements about mental illness emerging from our civil 
justice system.382  Indeed, as I have argued previously, court rulings that
permit discovery and potential admission of evidence of plaintiffs’
psychiatric history undoubtedly have a chilling effect on such plaintiffs’
ability to seek vindications of their rights through the courts.383 
A recent decision by Judge Jack B. Weinstein, unquestionably the 
most respected contemporary jurist on the law of evidence,384 
exemplifies this point. In McMillan v. City of New York, Judge
Weinstein rejected the use of race-based statistics regarding future 
earnings and life expectancy when calculating damages in tort 
actions.385  Judge Weinstein concluded that employing a race-based
analysis would violate the “normative constitutional requirements” of
Due Process and Equal Protection.386  He also noted the dangers 
presented with basing damage awards on an ambiguous label such as 
race—a social construct—which he deemed an unreliable basis for 
calculating damages awards.387  “By allowing the use of ‘race’-based 
life expectancy tables, which are based on historical data,” he reasoned,
“courts are essentially reinforcing the underlying social inequalities of
381 See Shauer, supra note 108, at 303; Stein, supra note 112, at 225 n.24 (“[The] egalitarian 
appearance of free proof is merely superficial.”). 
382 Radin, supra note 173, at 83 (“[L]aw not only reflects culture, but also shapes it.  The law 
is a powerful conceptual-rhetorical, discursive-force.  It expresses conventional understandings of
value, and at the same time influences conventional understandings of value.”).
383 Smith, supra note 6, at 135-39. 
384 Association of American Law Schools recently awarded Judge Weinstein the first 
Wigmore Award for Lifetime Achievement in Evidence. See Margaret Berger, The Inaugural 
Wigmore Awards for Lifetime Achievement in the Area of the Law of Evidence and the Process of 
Proof, Introduction of Judge Jack B. Weinstein, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 861 (2008). 
385 McMillan v. City of New York, 253 F.R.D. 247, 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
386 Id. at 248, 255-56. 
387 Id. at 256. 
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our society rather than describing a significant biological difference.”388 
His decision acknowledged the broader statement that the court would
be making about the construct of race if the court were to consider the 
plaintiff’s “race” when calculating his losses. 
While courts have not placed the equal protection rights of those 
with mental illness on par with those subjected to racial discrimination,
the essential observation in the McMillan decision applies more 
broadly: The position of litigants as full citizens is undermined to the 
extent we allow legal decisions to be based upon evidence that 
expressly links them to groups that are traditionally disfavored, 
disempowered, and discredited.  When a court permits a plaintiff to be 
labeled “mentally ill” over her objection for purposes of questioning her
credibility and entitlement to compensation for injuries, it serves as an
endorsement by our legal system of discounting plaintiffs, and others,
by using such label.  The validation of this practice by the very
institution charged with ensuring justice necessarily undermines
attempts to reverse the stigmatization of mental illness in our society 
and, indeed, serves to reinforce the stigma. 
388 Id. at 250. 
